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Abstract
We model firm adaptation to local factor markets in which firms care about both the price
and availability of inputs. The model is estimated by combining firm and population census
data, and quantifies the role of factor markets in input use, productivity and welfare. Consid-
ering China’s diverse factor markets, we find within industry interquartile labor costs vary by
30-80%, leading to 3-12% interquartile differences in TFP. In general equilibrium, homoge-
nization of labor markets would increase real income by 1.33%. Favorably endowed regions
attract more economic activity, providing new insights into within-country comparative advan-
tage and specialization.
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1 Introduction
Although firms may face radically different production conditions, this dimension of firm hetero-
geneity is often overlooked. A number of studies document large and persistent differences in
productivity across both countries and firms (Syverson, 2011). However, these differences remain
largely ‘some sort of measure of our ignorance’. This paper inquires to what extent the supply
characteristics of regional input markets might help explain such systematic productivity disper-
sion across firms, differences which remain a ‘black box’ (Melitz and Redding, 2014). It would be
surprising if disparate factor markets result in similar outcomes, when clearly the prices and qual-
ity of inputs available vary considerably. This paper models firm adaptation to such factor market
variation in a general equilibrium framework. The structural equations of the model are simple to
estimate and the estimation results quantify the importance of local factor markets for firm input
use, productivity and welfare.
Differences between factor markets, especially for labor, are likely to be especially stark. Even
the relatively fluid US labor market exhibits high migration costs as measured by the wage differ-
ential required to drive relocation and ‘substantial departures from relative factor price equality’
(Kennan and Walker (2011), Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2013)). Thus, free movement of fac-
tors does not mean frictionless movement, and recent work has indicated imperfect factor mobility
has sizable economic effects (Topalova, 2010). Rather than considering the forces which cause
workers to relocate, this paper instead inquires what existing differences in regional input markets
imply for firm behavior.
We take an approach rooted in the general equilibrium trade literature to understand how local
endowments impact firm behavior. We model firm entry across industries and regional markets
with differing distributions of worker types, wages and regional input quality. Firms vary in their
ability to effectively combine different types of labor (e.g. Bowles, 1970), and hire the optimal
combination of workers given local conditions and search costs. As the ease of finding any type
of worker increases with their regional supply, firm hiring depends on the joint distribution of
worker types and wages. Our estimates indeed confirm that contrary to standard neoclassical
models, firm hiring responds to both the wages and availability of worker types. Since each firm’s
optimal workforce varies by industry and region, the comparative advantage of regions varies
within industry. Since industries also differ in factor intensity, local capital and materials costs
also influence the comparative advantage of a region.1 Firms thus locate in proportion to the cost
advantages available.2
1Here the comparison of firms within country isolates the role of factor markets from known international differ-
ences in production technology: e.g. Trefler (1993), Fadinger (2011) and Nishioka (2012).
2Effective labor costs are driven by the complementarity of regional endowments with industry technology, and
the paper refers to these additional real production possibilities as ‘productivity’.
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But are these differences economically important? To quantify real world supply conditions,
we use the model to derive estimating equations which fix: 1) hiring by wage and worker type
distributions, 2) substitution into non-labor inputs, 3) firm location in response to local factor mar-
kets, and 4) the role of heterogeneous factor markets on real income. The estimation strategy
combines manufacturing and population census data for China in the mid-2000s, a setting which
exhibits substantial variation of a large number of labor market conditions (see Figures 5.1b, 5.2,
Appendix). By revealing how firm demand for skills varies with local conditions, the model quan-
tifies the unit costs for labor across China when firms care about both wages and worker availability
in the presence of hiring frictions. The estimates imply within industry interquartile differences
in effective labor costs of 30 to 80 percent. A second stage estimates production technology, ex-
plicitly accounting for regional costs and substitution into non-labor inputs. Once substitution is
accounted for, labor costs result in interquartile productivity differences of 3 to 12 percent, and
local factor markets explain 6 to 30 percent of the variance of productivity.3,4
In contrast to studies which look solely at TFP differences, this paper pushes further into the
microeconomic foundations of how local factor markets impact input usage and thereby influence
productivity. It also fully specifies consumer behavior and industrial organization to arrive at a wel-
fare analysis that considers the supply and entry decisions of firms in response to distortions.5 The
model implies that homogenizing worker distributions and wages across factor markets would in-
crease real incomes by 1.33 percent. Furthermore, we show that in general equilibrium, economic
activity tends to locate where regional costs are lowest, as supported by the data.
We conclude this section by relating the paper to existing work. The paper then continues
by laying out a model that incorporates a rich view of the labor hiring process. The model ex-
plains how firms internalize the local distribution of worker types and wages to maximize profits,
resulting in an industry specific unit cost of labor by region. Section 3 places these firms in a gen-
eral equilibrium, monopolistic competition framework, and addresses the determination of factor
prices, welfare and firm location. Section 4 explains how the model can be estimated with a simple
nested OLS approach, which allows for well developed techniques such as instrumental variable
estimators to be used. Section 5 discusses details of the data, while Section 6 presents model
estimates and uses them to explain the effect of different regional input markets on firm hiring,
productivity, location and welfare. Section 7 concludes.
Related work. This paper models firms which depend on local factor markets in a fashion
typified by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory of international trade (e.g. Vanek (1968), Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2007)). The departures from H-O-V in the model relax assumptions about
3These substantial differences underscore Kugler and Verhoogen (2011): since TFP is often the ‘primary measure
of [...] performance’, accounting for local factor markets might substantially alter estimates of policy effects.
4Put together, capital and materials frictions explain a similar range of productivity differences.
5TFP differences are not alone sufficient to induce distortions in general equilibrium (Dhingra and Morrow, 2012).
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perfect labor substitutability and homogeneous factor markets, which quantifies the role of local
labor markets and input costs. On the product market side, we consider many goods as indicated
by Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) as appropriate when considering the locational role of factor
endowments. At the industry level, we follow Melitz (2003), but add free entry by firms across
regions. A firm’s optimal location depends on local costs which arise from the regional distribution
of worker types and wages, but competition from firms which enter the same region prevent com-
plete specialization. The model quantifies the intensity of firm entry and shows that within country,
advantageous local factor markets are important for understanding specialization patterns.6
Recently, both Borjas (2013) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) have emphasized the importance
of more complete model frameworks to estimate substitution between worker types. In distinction
to the labor literature, our interest is firm substitution across factor markets. Dovetailing with this
are theories proposing that different industries perform optimally under different degrees of skill
diversity. Grossman and Maggi (2000) build a theoretical model explaining how differences in
skill dispersion across countries could determine comparative advantage and global trade patterns.
Building on this work, Morrow (2010) models multiple industries and general skill distributions,
and finds that skill diversity explains productivity and export differences in developing countries.
The importance of local market characteristics, especially in developing countries, has recently
been emphasized by Karadi and Koren (2012). These authors calibrate a spatial firm model to
sector level data in developing countries to better account for the role of firm location in measured
productivity. Moretti (2011) reviews work on local labor markets and agglomeration economies,
explicitly modeling spatial equilibrium across labor markets. Distinct from this literature, we
take the outcome of spatial labor markets as given and focus on the trade offs firms face and the
consequences of regional markets on effective labor costs and firm location.7,8
Although we are unaware of other studies estimating model primitives as a function of lo-
cal market characteristics, existing empirical work is consonant with the theoretical implications.
Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008) find that higher skill dispersion is associated with higher TFP
in Italy. Similarly, Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2014) find that diversity in education leads
to higher productivity in Denmark. Martins (2008) finds that firm wage dispersion affects firm
performance in Portugal. Bombardini, Gallipoli, and Pupato (2012) use literacy scores to show
6In spirit, this result is akin to Fitzgerald and Hallak (2004) who study the role of cross country productivity
differences in specialization. In this paper, differences in unit labor costs predict specialization across regions.
7Several papers have explored how different aspects of labor affect firm-level productivity. There is substantial
work on the effect of worker skills on productivity (Abowd Kramarz and Margolis (1999, 2005), Fox and Smeets
(2011)). Other labor characteristics that drive productivity include managerial talent and practices (Bloom and Reenen,
2007), social connections among workers (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2009), organizational form (Garicano and
Heaton, 2010) and incentive pay (Lazear, 2000).
8Determinants of productivity include market structure (Syverson, 2004), product market rivalry and technology
spillovers (Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen, 2013) and vertical integration (see Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007)
and Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012)).
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that countries with more dispersed skills specialize in industries characterized by lower skill com-
plementarity. In contrast, this paper combines firm and population census data to explicitly model
regional differences, leading to micro founded identification and estimates. The method used is
novel, and results of this paper highlight the degree to which firm behavior is influenced through
the availability of inputs at the micro level.9
Clearly this study also contributes to the empirical literature on Chinese productivity. Ma, Tang,
and Zhang (2014) show that exporting is positively correlated with TFP and that firms self select
into exporting which, ex post, further increases TFP. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012)
estimate Chinese firm TFP, showing that new entry accounts for two thirds of TFP growth and that
TFP growth dominates input accumulation as a source of output growth. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
posit that India and China have lower productivity relative to the US due to resource misallocation
and compute how manufacturing TFP in India and China would increase if resource allocation
was similar to that of the US. Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013) perform a more aggregate analysis
of misallocation between state and non-state firms across provinces, detailing aggregate dynamic
trends and finding TFP losses of approximately 20%.10 Distinct from these studies, we focus on
the internal responses of firms to detailed local conditions and carry these microeconomic firm
foundations through to aggregate analyses of entry and consumer welfare in general equilibrium.
2 The Role of Local Factor Markets in Production
This section develops a model of local factor markets which impact firms’ input choices, costs
and productivity. Firms combine homogeneous inputs (materials, capital) and differentiated inputs
(types of labor). We model variation in regional capital and material quality and detailed labor
markets in which firms search for workers. When hiring, firms respond to both the wages and
quantities of locally available worker types. While homogeneous inputs are mobile within indus-
tries, we take the distribution of labor endowments as given from the firm perspective and ask how
observed regional supply effects firm workforce composition and productivity.11 Our empirical
strategy of using observed factor market outcomes (which can at best be only imperfectly gener-
ated by any underlying theory of factor movements) accommodates many possible influences on
the distribution of factors while focusing on our core questions regarding firm behavior under the
assumption that individual firms are too small to influence aggregate conditions. Here we proceed
9The importance of backward linkages for firm behavior are a recurring theme in both the development and eco-
nomic geography literature, see Hirschman (1958) and recently Overman and Puga (2010).
10How the mechanisms of this paper interact with the above mechanisms is a potential area for further work and
might help explain the Chinese export facts of Manova and Zhang (2012) and the different impact of liberalization
across trade regimes found by Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015).
11Special cases of the model include perfect factor mobility (potentially equal endowments in all regions in the
absence of frictions) or equalization up to frictional input costs.
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with a detailed specification of the labor hiring process, solving for firms’ optimal responses to
local labor market supply conditions. This quantifies the unit cost for labor by region in terms of
observable local conditions and model parameters.
2.1 Searching for Workers in a Local Factor Market
Firms within an industry T face a neoclassical production technology which combines materials M,
capital K and labor L to produce output. While materials and capital are composed of homogeneous
units, effective labor is produced by combining S different skill types of workers. These different
worker types are distributed unequally across regions. The distribution of worker types in region R
is denoted aR =
(
aR,1, . . . ,aR,S
)
, while the distribution of wages is denoted wR =
(
wR,1, . . . ,wR,S
)
.
While wages are endogenous to local factor market conditions, they are exogenous from the per-
spective of firms and workers. Workers do not contribute equally to output. This occurs for two
reasons. First, each type provides an industry specific level of human capital mTi . Second, when
a worker meets a firm, this match has a random quality h ≥ 1 which follows a Pareto distribution
with pdf k/hk+1 and k > 1.12
In order to interview workers, a firm must pay a fixed search cost of f effective labor units,
at which point they may hire from a distribution of worker types aR. The firm hires on the basis
of match quality, and consequently chooses a minimum threshold of match quality for each type
they will retain, h = (h1, . . . ,hS).
13 Upon keeping a preferred set of workers, the firm chooses a
continuous number N times to repeat this process until achieving their desired workforce. At the
end of hiring, the amount of human capital produced by each type i is given by
Hi ≡ N ·aR,imTi
∫ ∞
hi
h ·
(
k/hk+1
)
dh. (2.1)
From a firm’s perspective, the threshold of worker match quality h is a means to choose an optimal
level of H. However, as a firm lowers its quality threshold, it faces an increasing average cost of
each type of human capital Hi . These increasing average costs induce the firm to maintain hi ≥ 1
and to increase N to search harder for suitable workers.
The amount of L produced by the firm depends on the composition of a team through a tech-
12Clear extensions of the model would be to model individual worker characteristics or surplus sharing that gives
rise to wage dispersion. However, these are beyond the scope of our stylized general equilibrium setting and data
resolution. Instead, we will control for worker characteristics at the level of the firm in the empirics.
13This assumption is familiar from labor search models (see Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010)). Unlike
Helpman, et al., here differences in hiring patterns are determined by local market conditions.
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nological parameter θT in the following way:
L≡
(
Hθ
T
1 +H
θT
2 + . . .+H
θT
S
)1/θT
. (2.2)
Notice that in the case of θT = 1, this specification collapses to a model where L is the total level
of human capital ∑Hi. More generally, the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution of type i for
type i′ is (Hi/Hi′)
θT−1. θT < 1 implies worker types are complementary, so that the firm’s ideal
workforce tends to represent a mix of all types (Figure 2.1a). In contrast, for θT > 1, firms are more
dependent on singular sources of human capital as L becomes convex in the input of each single
type (Figure 2.1b).14 Below, we show that despite the convexity inherent in Figure 2.1b, once
firms choose the quality of their workers through hiring standards h, the labor isoquants resume
their typical shapes as in Figure 2.1c, which allows for the possibility of θT > 1 (which is often
assumed away in many studies to ensure concavity of the firm’s hiring problem.)
Figure 2.1: Human Capital Isoquants
(a) Supermodular Production in H (b) Submodular Production in H (c) Submodular Production in h
Although the technology θT is the same for all firms in an industry, firms do not all face the
same regional factor markets. Explicitly modeling these disparate markets emphasizes the role of
regional heterogeneity in supplying human capital inputs to the firm in terms of both price and
quality. This provides not only differences in productivity across regions by technology, but since
industries differ in technology, local market conditions are more or less amenable to particular
industries. We now detail the hiring process, introducing different markets and deriving firms’
optimal hiring to best accommodate these differences.
2.2 Unit Labor Costs by Region and Technology
The total costs of hiring labor depend on the regional wage rates wR, the availability of workers
aR, and the unit cost of labor in region R using technology T , labeled cTR . Since the total number
14See Morrow (2010) for a more detailed interpretation of super- and sub-modularity and implications.
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of each type i hired is NaR,i/hki , the total hiring bill is
Total Hiring Costs : N
[
∑
i
wR,iaR,i/hki + f c
T
R
]
. (2.3)
To produce effective labor, the firm faces a trade off between the quantity and quality of workers
hired. For instance, the firm might hire a large number of workers and “cherry pick” the best
matches by choosing high values for h. Alternatively, the firm might save on interviewing costs
f by choosing a low number of prospectives N and permissively low values for h. The unit labor
cost function (minimum of Equation (2.3) subject to L = 1) may be solved (Appendix G.4) as
Unit Labor Costs : cTR =
[
∑
i hired
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)]θT /βT
](βT /θT)/(1−k)
, (2.4)
where
βT ≡ θT + k− kθT . (2.5)
The trade off between being more selective (high h) and avoiding search costs ( f cTR) is illustrated
by the following Equation implied by the firm’s first order conditions for cost minimization:
∑
i
aR,iwR,i
∫ ∞
hi
(h−hi)/hi ·
(
k/hk+1
)
dh= f cTR . (2.6)
The LHS of Equation (2.6) decreases in h, so when a firm faces lower interviewing costs it can
afford to be more selective by increasing h. Conversely, in the presence of high interviewing
costs, the firm optimally “lowers their standards” h to increase the size of their workforce without
interviewing additional workers. The number of times a firm goes to hire workers, N, can be solved
as N = 1/ f k. Thus, N is decreasing in both hiring costs and k. Increases in k imply lower expected
match quality, so that repeatedly searching for new workers has lower returns.
2.3 Optimal Local Hiring Patterns
The above reasoning shows the relationship between technology and the optimal choice of worker
types. It is intuitive that if the right tail of the match quality distribution is sufficiently thick,
there are excellent matches for each type of worker, so all types are hired.15 Since match quality
follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, expected match quality is k/(k−1). As k
15This is important, not only for the analytical convenience of avoiding complete specialization in the hiring of
worker types, but also because we find that each region-industry combination hires all types of workers in the data.
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approaches one, match quality increases, so for k sufficiently close to one, all worker types are
hired. A sufficient condition for a firm to optimally hire every type of worker, stated as Proposition
1, is that βT of (2.5) is positive.16 This induces the isoquants depicted in Figure 2.1c, which
illustrates a more standard trade off between different types of workers, so long as the coordinates
are transformed to the space of hiring standards h.
Proposition 1. If βT > 0 then it is optimal for a firm to hire all types of workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, for βT > 0, all worker types are hired. The optimal share of workers of type i hired by
firm j under technology T in region R, labeled sTR,i j, is:
17
sTR,i j = a
θT /βT
R,i w
−k/βT
R,i
(
mTi
) kθT /βT (c˜TR)(k−1)θT /βT ( f (k−1))−θT /βT . (2.7)
where c˜TR denotes the unit labor cost function at wages
{
wk/(k−1)θ
T
R,i
}
. Notice that in (2.7) , unlike
most production models, the factor prices wR are not sufficient to determine the factor shares a
firm will buy. The availability of workers aR is crucial in determining shares hired because costly
search makes firms sensitive to the local supply of each worker type.18
2.4 Unit Costs: The Role of Substitution
In order to model substitution into non-labor inputs conditional on local labor costs, we assume
the production technology of each industry T assumes a Cobb-Douglas form:
Output for a firm in Industry T : Mα
T
M Kα
T
K Lα
T
L , where αTM +α
T
K +α
T
L = 1. (2.8)
Industry specific capital is available to firms at rental rate rTK and similarly, materials are available
at price rTM. However, regional characteristics may augment or reduce the effectiveness of capital
and materials in a region by frictions κR and µR, so that the effective rental rate of capital in region
R is κRrTK and the effective price of materials is µRrTM.19
Equation (2.4) summarizes the cost of one unit of labor L in terms of the Pareto shape parameter
k, the technology θT and regional characteristics aR and wR. It is then straightforward to derive
16This clearly holds for θT ≤ 1, and for θT > 1, the condition is equivalent to k < θT/(θT −1).
17See Supplemental Appendix.
18One potentially important extension beyond the scope of our data is firm transition dynamics with existing work-
forces who take time to adapt to changes in local labor markets.
19One view of this assumption is that it allows for a static realization of regional dynamic forces that influence
factor efficiency that are beyond the scope of this paper, e.g. Cingano and Schivardi (2004). Another is that it captures
differences in local factor market development (e.g. for credit as in Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi, 2013).
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total unit costs from (2.4) and (2.8) as
Total Unit Costs : uTR =
(
κRrTK/α
T
K
)αTK (µRrTM/αTM)αTM (cTR/αTL )αTL , (2.9)
where uTR represents the regional component of unit costs for industry T in region R. Within an
industry, productivity then varies across regions as in the following example: assume Firm 1 in
region R and Firm 2 in region R′ have the same total expenditure on inputs, E. By definition, Firm
1’s output, Y1, is E/uTR while Firm 2’s output Y2 is E/u
T
R′ . Therefore relative output is
Y1/Y2 = uTR′/u
T
R = (κR′/κR)
αTK (µR′/µR)
αTM
(
cTR′/c
T
R
)αTL .
Industry differences in productivity therefore depend on 1) regional labor costs and quality and 2)
the intensity of factors in production. Estimating both quantifies regional productivity differences.
However, we first resolve factor prices and firm location in general equilibrium.
3 Firm Production under Monopolistic Competition
This section combines the insights into firm behavior just developed into a general equilibrium
model to understand the implications of regional factor markets for welfare and firm location.
Firms, who are ex ante identical, choose among regions to locate. Key to a firm’s location de-
cision are the expected profits of entry. These profits depend on 1) the regional distribution of
worker types and wages, 2) capital and material quality and 3) the competition present from other
firms who enter the region. We characterize production and location choices conditional on local
factor markets. Most strikingly, lower regional production costs attract more firms for any given
technology, which determines the intensity of economic activity.
Furthermore, we show an equilibrium wage vector exists which supports these choices by firms
for any distribution of labor endowments (e.g. as would be implied by assuming nominal or real
wage equalization across regions). Thus, endowment distributions as implied by both complete
or incomplete labor mobility are consistent with this framework. Rather than use a macro level
model which determines worker location a priori, we will use micro level population census data to
observe the actual composition of labor markets.20 Our goal is to understand how firms optimally
respond to local factor markets as they are, not to predict where workers choose to locate.
20There are many forces at work in determining the composition of local labor markets in China. In this respect, the
literature is even unresolved as to what extent Chinese labor markets reflect an agriculturally transitioning ‘dual econ-
omy’ (Zhang, Yang, and Wang, 2011) or if models best suited to advanced industrial economies are more appropriate.
Since China has undergone sweeping changes within the last generation, we remain agnostic and rely on the data.
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3.1 Firms and Consumers
Each region R is endowed with a population PR. Firms may enter any region R by paying a sunk
entry cost of Fe output units, which costs uTRFe. Firms then receive a random marginal cost draw
η j ∼ G and face a fixed production cost of fe output units, which costs uTR fe.21 Each firm j
produces a distinct variety which is freely traded, produces a quantity QTR j, and in equilibrium a
mass of firmsMTR enter. Entrants who can make variable profits above fixed costs produce, namely
those with cost draws below some level ηTR . MTR and η
T
R together determine the set of varieties
available to consumers.
Consumer preferences over varieties take the Dixit-Stiglitz form
UTR ≡MTR
∫ ηTR
0
(
QTR j
)ρ
dG( j)
in each region and industry, with total utility ∑T,RσTR lnUTR , where σTR are relative weights put on
final goods normalized so that ∑T,RσTR = 1. As shown in the Appendix, each σTR is the share of
income spent on goods from each region and technology pair (R,T ).22
Firms are the sole sellers of their variety, and thus are monopolists who provide their variety at
a price PTR j. Consumers, in turn, face these prices, and a particular consumer with income I has the
following demand curve for each variety:
QTR j = I ·
(
PTR jU
T
R /σ
T
R
) 1
ρ−1 /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
) 1
ρ−1 Mtr
∫ η tr
0
((
Ptr,z
)ρ U tr) 1ρ−1 dG(z) . (3.1)
From Equation (3.1), clearly aggregate demand for variety j corresponds to that of a representative
consumer with income equal to aggregate income, I.23
After paying an entry cost, firms know their cost draw, which paired with regional input markets
determine their total unit cost uTR . Firms maximize profits by choosing an optimal price P
T
R j =
uTRη j/ρ , resulting in a markup of 1/ρ over costs. Firms who cannot make a positive profit do
not produce to avoid paying the fixed cost of production. Since profits decrease in costs, there
is a unique cutoff cost draw ηTR which implies zero profits, while firms with η j < η
T
R produce.
24
As there are no barriers to entry besides the sunk entry cost Fe, firms enter in every region until
21This follows Melitz (2003). G(η) is assumed to be absolutely continuous with E
[
ηρ/(ρ−1)
]
finite.
22Note that since the demand for goods from each (R,T ) pair enter preferences multiplicatively, complete special-
ization cannot occur which considerably simplifies the analysis.
23Since labor is supplied inelastically, necessarily I= ∑R∑i wR,iaR,iPR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Wages of Type i in R
+∑R∑T τMR r
T
MM
T + τKR r
T
KK
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non−labor Income
.
24The Appendix shows the cutoff cost ηTR depends only on fe, Fe, and G, and so does not vary by region or industry.
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expected profits are zero. This yields the
Spatial Zero Profit Condition :
∫ ηTR
0
(
PTR j−uTRη j
)
QTR j−uTR fe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits for firm j in R,T
dG( j) = uTRFe for all R,T.
3.2 Local Factor Markets and Welfare
Finally, differences in regional factor markets influence consumer welfare. As shown in the ap-
pendix, the equilibrium welfare of an economy with income I and Industry-Region unit costs is
given by (here Constant depends only on fe,Fe,G,ρ and σTR , see Appendix G.6):
Welfare = Constant+ lnI− ln∑
T,R
σTR lnu
T
R . (3.2)
From Equation (3.2), if unit costs were to change to
{
vTR
}
while holding aggregate income constant,
after allowing firms to adjust location and production decisions, the percentage change in real
income under from old to new unit costs would be
Percentage Change in Real Income =∏
T,R
(
uTR/v
T
R
)σTR −1. (3.3)
Having determined behavior in the product market, we now examine input markets.
3.3 Regional Factor Market Clearing
The remaining equilibrium conditions are that input prices guarantee firm input demand exhausts
materials, capital stocks, and each regional pool of workers. We assume industry specific stocks
of capital (KT ) and materials (MT ) are available. To fix expenditure, we assume each budget share
σTR is proportional to PR, so that σTR = σTPR for some σT .25 Since production is Cobb-Douglas,
the share of total costs (equal to I) which go to each factor is the factor output elasticity. Therefore
full resource utilization of materials and capital requires the effective capital (KTR ) and materials
(MTR ) used in each region to satisfy
MT =∑
R
µRMTR = α
T
Mσ
T IP/rTM, KT =∑
R
κRKTR = α
T
Kσ
T IP/rTK, (3.4)
where P ≡ ∑RPR is the total population. These equations capture the allocation of technology
specific resources across regions.
25This assumption implies that any two regions with identical skill distributions have the same wage schedule.
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In contrast, effective labor of LTR is produced by each technology in each region. Since the
wage bill LTRc
T
R must receive a share αTL of total revenues,
Aggregate Labor Demand : LTR = α
T
L σ
T IPR/cTR . (3.5)
Embedded in each LTR is the set of workers hired by firms attendant to regional market conditions.
The total demand for employees of each type in region R implied by Equation (2.7) must equal the
supply of aR,iPR. Wages are therefore determined by
aR,iwR,i =∑
T
σT︸︷︷︸
Industry Share Per Capita
· αTL︸︷︷︸
Labor Share
·HθTR,i /ΣzHθ
T
R,z︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type Share
·I for all R, i. (3.6)
Equation (3.6) shows that type i’s contribution to mean wages, aR,iwR,i, is the sum over income
spent an industry, times labor’s share, times the wages attributable to each type.26
Solving Equation (3.6) requires finding a wage for each worker type in each region that fully
employs all workers. We do so in the Appendix, leading to
Proposition 2. An equilibrium wage vector exists which clears each regional labor market.
3.4 Regional Specialization of Firms
Differences in input costs will influence the relative concentration of firms across regions through
entry. Since regions vary in population size, the relevant metric is the mass of firms per capita. The
impact of different regional costs on the mass of firms can be clearly seen by fixing an industry T
and considering a region R versus a region R′, as given by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Regions with lower factor costs have more firms per capita. In particular, if FTR
denotes the mass of firms per capita in region R, industry T then
ln
(
FTR/FTR′
)
= αTK ln(κR′/κR)+α
T
M ln(µR′/µR)+α
T
L ln
(
cTR′/c
T
R
)
. (3.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Equation (3.7) shows that areas with lower unit labor costs, capital costs or material costs
have more firms per capita. Note that these differences in firm density are not driven simply by
factor prices. Even if wages and frictions were identical across regions, the suitability of available
workers aR can cause regional specialization through differences in unit labor costs. Additionally,
the larger the share of a factor in production, the more important are differences between regions.
26The equilibrium type share is Hθ
T
R,i /ΣzH
θT
R,z =
(
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw1−kR,i
)θT /βT
/Σ j
(
aR, j
(
mTj
)
kw1−kR, j
)θT /βT
.
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The next section lays out a strategy to structurally estimate model parameters.
4 Estimation Strategy
This section lays out an estimator for the structural model parameters above. The estimator in-
volves two stages, with a simple intervening computation. The first stage determines regional
quality and firm labor demand, and unlike many approaches, is based on the firm-level shares of
workers hired across regions. The second stage equation uses regional unit labor costs from the
first stage to estimate the production function. Feasibility is illustrated by simulating a data set
consistent with the model above and recovering model primitives accurately with the estimator.
4.1 First Stage Estimation
As our estimation is performed for each industry T separately, here we will suppress industry
superscripts for brevity.
4.1.1 Estimating Firm Workforce Composition
Equation (2.7) determines the share of each type of workers hired in each region R and industry T .
Taking logs and allowing for errors εi j across firms j and types i implies
lnsR,i j =−(k/β ) lnwR,i+(θ/β ) lnaR,i+(θk/β ) lnmi+Fixed EffectR+ εi j, (4.1)
To estimate this equation we use a combination of type and region fixed effects.27 To further
explain how regional variation identifies the model we discuss equilibrium hiring predicted by
Equation (4.1) in Appendix G.2.
In order to control for firm characteristics which might influence hiring patterns across worker
types, mi is allowed to vary with firm observables labeled Controls j:
mi j ≡ mi · exp
(
Controls jγi
)
, (4.2)
where γi is a type-industry specific control for the value of each worker type in an industry. The
inclusion of Controls j allows unit costs to vary by firm within a region. We will use such worker
type specific controls to capture the effects of economic geography (e.g. deeper urban labor mar-
kets and skill agglomeration) and firm organization (e.g. foreign ownership). Finally, the linear
27This estimation strategy identifies relative worker type contributions, e.g. type and region fixed effects omitting
the highest type correspond to estimates of (θ/β )k lnmi/mS. This strategy does not identify the labor required to find
workers ( f ), and consequently in subsequent estimation steps f will be differenced out by the industry average.
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form of Equation (4.1) allows many well understood estimation techniques to be applied to the
model, such as instrumental variable approaches.
4.1.2 Estimating Regional Frictions
Regional capital and material quality can be estimated using each firm j’s input expenditure ratios
of capital to wages (KR, j/WR, j) and materials to wages (MR, j/WR, j), because at the region level,
these ratios deviate from the industry average. In particular, allowing for errors ζ j,K and ζ j,M, the
Cobb-Douglas production technology of (2.8) implies
lnKR, j/WR, j = lnαK/αLrK− lnκR+ζ j,K, lnMR, j/WR, j = lnαM/αLrM− lnµR+ζ j,M. (4.3)
4.1.3 The Role of Model Assumptions in Estimation
Implicit in this estimation strategy is the assumption that firms take local factor market conditions
as exogenous to their own behavior. In particular, we have assumed firms do not have monop-
sony power over their local factor market (e.g. Manning (2011)), and accordingly we restrict our
analysis to regions with a minimum of five employers.
Since we are explaining firm hiring behavior in response to exogenous local market conditions,
one endogeniety concern might be that regional factors simultaneously shift the supply or wages of
manufacturing workers and individual firm demand across worker types. Accordingly, below we
implement an instrumental variables strategy to address this potential source of endogeniety and
assess the robustness of the estimates.
Finally, the estimates of unit labor costs and regional frictions for capital and materials are
completely distinct and do not rely on estimates of each other. However, all of them together
influence the estimation of substitution between these three inputs, which we now detail.
4.2 Second Stage Estimation
The first stage estimator just laid out estimates θ , k, mi/mS, and γi. Therefore can estimate intrain-
dustry differences in unit labor cost functions, ∆ lncR ≡ E
[
lncR j|R,T,Controls j
]−E[lncR j|T ].
From above, revenues PR jQR j for a firm j satisfy
lnPR jQR j = αM lnM j/µR+αK lnK j/κR+αL lnL j− lnρ− lnη j. (4.4)
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As firm expenditure on labor L · cR j equals the share αL of revenues PR jQR j, we have L jcR j =
αLPR jQR j and taking differences with the industry mean gives
∆ lnL j = ∆ lnPR jQR j−∆ lncR j. (4.5)
Taking differences of Equation (4.4) with the industry mean and rearranging using (4.5) yields
∆ lnPR jQR j =
αM
1−αL∆ ln
M j
µR
+
αK
1−αL∆ ln
K j
κR
− αL
1−αL∆ lncR j−
1
1−αL∆ lnη j. (4.6)
In the Appendix, we illustrate the estimator by simulating the production model above and apply
these steps. In the simulation, the two stage estimator explains 97% of the variation in firm out-
put, suggesting that the ease of implementation comes at only a small efficiency cost. Since the
equations implied by the model are linear, well known methods to accommodate such features as
heteroskedasticity can be easily introduced.
The entire estimation procedure is now briefly recapped.
4.3 Estimation Procedure Summary
The data required to estimate the impact of the local labor on firm composition is:
1. The shares of worker types within firms.
2. The average wages and workforce shares of each worker type in a firm’s locality.
These are used to estimate Equation (4.1) by industry, using type and region fixed effects.
Optionally, the regional quality of capital and materials may be estimated using input expendi-
ture ratios and industry fixed effects as in Equation (4.3). The remaining procedure is as follows:
1. Recover θ̂ , k̂, m̂i/mS and γ̂i (optionally κ̂R , µ̂R) and bootstrap standard errors.
2. Calculate ∆̂ lncR j from Equation (2.4) using regional data and estimated parameters.
3. Estimate Equation (4.6) using firm production data, ∆̂ lncR j, κ̂R and µ̂R. Errors can be mod-
eled through FGLS, and by construction should allow the error variance to vary by region.
Having laid out both a model detailing the interaction of firm technologies with local market con-
ditions and specifying an estimation strategy, we now apply the method to China. The next section
discusses these data in detail while the sequel presents results.
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5 Data
Firm data come from the 2004 Survey of Industrial Firms conducted by the Chinese National
Bureau of Statistics, which includes all state owned enterprises and private enterprises with sales
over 5 million RMB. The data include firm ownership, location, industry, employees by education
level, profit and cash flow statements. Firm capital stock is reported fixed capital, less reported
depreciation while materials are measured by value. For summary statistics, see Appendix H.1.
From the Survey, a sample was constructed of manufacturing firms who report positive net fixed
assets, material inputs, output, value added and wages.2829 The final sample includes 127,082 firms
in 284 prefectures and 16 industries at the two digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification
level.
Regional wage distributions are calculated from the 0.5% sample of the 2005 China Population
Census. The census contains the education level by prefecture of residence, occupation, industry
code, monthly income and weekly hours of work. We restrict the sample to employees age 15 to
65 who report positive wages and hours of work. The regional wage distribution is recovered from
the average annual income of employees by education using census data.30
GIS data from the China Data Center at the University of Michigan locates firms at the county
and prefecture level. Port locations are provided by GIS data and supplemented by data from the
World Port Index. These data provide controls for urban status, distance to port, highway density
and distance to cities.
Finally, welfare calculations rely on household consumption shares for each industry are ag-
gregated from the three digit level from the 2002 Input-Output Table of China, as constructed by
the Department of National Economy Accounting, State Statistical Bureau.
Figure 5.1a illustrates the prefectures of China, which we define as regions from the perspec-
tive of the model above. Prefectures are similar in population size to a US commuting zone, as
used by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and computed by Tolbert and Sizer (1996). Prefectures
illustrated by a darker shade in the Figure operate under substantially different government poli-
cies and objectives. These regions typically have large minority populations or historically distinct
conditions, with the majority declared as autonomous regions, and have idiosyncratic regulations,
development, and educational policies. We exclude the five Autonomous Provinces and one pre-
dominantly minority Province (Qinghai) which has a very low density of population and economic
28The results are robust to exclusion of firms with fewer than 8 employees which operate in a different legal regime.
29The welfare counterfactuals for industries with β < 0 are theoretically problematic so we exclude them.
30While firm data is from 2004 and census data is from 2005, the limited evidence on firm skill mix is that it is
remarkably stable over time: Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) find the standard deviation of plant-level education
years is very stable from 1995-2004 in Finland, and Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2011) find that a firm-level
education diversity index was roughly constant over a decade in Denmark.
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activity.31 What remains are the lighter shaded regions of Figure 5.1a, preserving 284 prefectures
displaying distinct labor market conditions.
Figure 5.1: Chinese Prefectures
(a) Chinese Prefectures (b) Average Monthly Income of Employees (2005)
5.1 Worker Types
Workers are defined as people between ages 15 and 65 who work outside the agricultural sector and
are not employers, self-employed, or in a family business. This characterization includes migrants.
The definition of distinct, imperfectly substitutable worker types is based primarily on formal
schooling attained. Census data from 2005 shows that the average years of schooling for workers
in China ranges from 8.5 to 11.8 years across provinces, with sparse postgraduate education. The
most common level of formal education is at the Junior High School level or below. Reflecting
substantial wage differences by gender within that group, we define Type 1 workers as Junior
High School or Below: Female and Type 2 workers as Junior High School or Below: Male.32
Completion of Senior High School defines Type 3 and completion of Junior College or Higher
Education defines Type 4.
5.2 Regional Variation
Key to the analysis is regional variation in skill distribution and wages. Here we briefly discuss
both, with further details in Appendix H. While this paper explains individual firms’ responses to
existing labor market conditions rather than providing a theory of worker location, it is clear that the
recent history of China has exhibited massive internal migration (Chan, 2013).33 Monthly incomes
vary substantially across China as illustrated in Figure 5.1b. This is due to both the composition of
31See the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China document cited.
32Differentiation of gender for low skill labor is especially important in developing countries as a variety of influ-
ences result in imperfect substitutability across gender. Bernhofen and Brown (2011) distinguish between skilled male
labor, unskilled male labour and female labour and find that the factor prices across these types differ substantially.
33In 2005, the median share of within prefecture migration is 77 percent, dominating across prefecture migration.
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skills (proxied by education) across regions and the rates paid to these skills. Figure 5.2 contrasts
educational distributions of the labor force. Figure 5.2(a) shows those with a Junior High School
education (the mandated level in China), while Figure 5.2(b) displays those with a Junior College
or higher level of attainment.
Figure 5.2: Low and High Educational Attainment Across China (2005)
(a) % Labor Force with ≤ Junior High School (b) % Labor Force with ≥ Junior College
The differing composition of input markets across China in 2004-2005 stem from many factors,
including the dynamic nature of China’s rapidly growing economy, targeted economic policies
and geographic agglomeration of industries across China.34 Faber (2014) finds that expansion of
China’s National Trunk Highway System displaced economic activity from counties peripheral
to the System. Similarly, Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner, and Zhang (2017) show that
mass transit systems in China have increased the population density in city centers, while radial
highways around cities have dispersed population and industrial activity. An overview of Chinese
economic policies is provided by Defever and Riano (2017), who quantify their impact on firms.
Of particular interest for labor markets are substantial variation in wages and the attendant mi-
gration this induces. The quantitative extent to which labor market migration has been stymied
by the hukou system of internal passports is not well studied, although its impact has likely less-
ened since 2000.35 Since little is known about the impact of illegal immigration on firm behav-
ior (see Brown, Hotchkiss, and Quispe-Agnoli (2013) for a notable exception), and as the ease
of obtaining a legal hukou is not independent of education,36 we control for the regional share
of non-agricultural hukou held by each type of worker without any a priori expectation of sign.
Given that rural to urban migration typifies the pattern of structural transformation underway, we
34We consider regional price variation at a fixed point in time. Reallocation occurs (Ge and Yang, 2014) and is
important in explaining dynamics (e.g. Borjas (2003)), but dynamics are outside the scope of this paper.
35The Hukou system and its reform in the late 1990s are well explained in Chan and Buckingham (2008). The per-
sistence of such a stratified system has engendered deep set social attitudes which likely affect economic interactions
between Hukou groups, see Afridi, Li, and Ren (2012).
36High income and highly educated workers can more easily move among urban regions as local governments are
likely to approve their migration applications (Chan, Liu, and Yang, 1999).
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control for rural and urban effects for each type of worker below. While modeling dynamic worker
considerations is beyond the scope of this paper, presumably the dynamic forces that impact the
manufacturing labor force would similarly impact the service sector labor force, and accordingly
we re-estimate the structural parameters instrumenting manufacturing labor market conditions with
service sector labor market conditions as reported by the Population Census sample.
Having discussed the data, we now apply the estimation procedure developed above.
6 Estimation Results
This section reports estimation results, then turns to a discussion of the quantitative labor cost and
productivity differences accounted for by local market conditions in China. The section continues
by comparing the ability of the model to explain productivity differences with this unit cost based
method with one approach common in the literature, which does not account for regional factor
markets and models labor types as input stocks. We then quantify the importance of the estimated
productivity differences for welfare by using the general equilibrium model to consider a hypothet-
ical Chinese economy in which the distribution of workers and wages across regions is equalized.
Finally, we test the firm location implications of the model, finding support that economic activity
locates where estimated unit labor costs are lower.
6.1 Estimates of Market Conditions and Production Technologies
The full first stage regression results for several manufacturing industries in China are presented
in Tables A.3 and A.4 of Appendix C. A representative set of estimates for the General Machines
industry are presented in Table 1. The first box in Table 1, labeled Primary Variables, are consistent
with the model: increases in the local wages for a type decrease firm demand for that type, while
increases in the availability of a type increase firm demand.37 Though values for the coefficients(
θT/βT
)
lnmTi /m
T
4 are not specified by the model, their estimated values do increase in type in
Table 1, which is consonant with formal education increasing worker output.
The remaining two boxes include regional controls from the Census and firm level controls
from the manufacturing survey. The regional controls are by prefecture, and include the percentage
of each type with a non-agricultural Hukou. The firm level controls include the share of foreign
equity, whether the firm is in an urban area, and the age of the firm. Most interestingly, firms in
urban areas or with higher shares of foreign equity tend to have increasingly higher demand for
37This second result is in line with recent findings on firm and industry responses to changes in labor supply of
Gonzalez and Ortega (2011) and Dustmann and Glitz (2015).
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higher skilled workers, as evidenced by the increasing pattern of coefficients across worker types.38
Table 1: First Stage Results: General Machines
Primary Variables ln(% Hired) Firm Controls
ln(wR,i) -2.687*** m1 ∗Urban Dummy -1.384***
ln(aR,i) 1.794*** m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.980***
m1 (≤Junior HS: Female) -10.170*** m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.427***
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -6.171*** m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.336***
m3 (Senior High School) -3.180*** m1∗% Foreign Equity -2.448***
m2∗% Foreign Equity -1.864***
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.311***
Regional Controls m4∗% Foreign Equity 3.847***
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou -5.957*** m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.934***
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.072*** m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.403***
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.218*** m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.143***
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -7.026*** m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.351***
Observations: 62,908. R2 : 0.139 Includes Regional Fixed Effects
Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
Inclusion of controls for average worker age, which control for accumulated skill or vintage
human capital, do not appreciably alter the results. Other controls which did not appreciably alter
the results include state ownership39, distance to port, firm size and the percentage of migrants in
a region.
6.1.1 Explanatory Importance of Local Worker Availability versus Wages
One innovation of the model and empirical strategy is to estimate and quantify the role of local
worker availability in firm hiring decisions. While this is novel, its empirical relevance is supported
by both the significance of the coefficients on worker availability (Tables A.3 and A.4), but also
by the higher explanatory value of worker availability. This is demonstrated in Figure 6.1, which
displays the R2 of regressions by industry using the specification of Table 1 in black, and the
corresponding R2 for the same specification omitting availability (light grey) or wages (dark grey).
In almost every industry, worker availability explains more firm workforce variation than wages.40
38The latter of these two patterns is supported by estimates of the skill composition in Swedish firms by Carl
Davidson, Fredrik Heyman, Steven Matusz, Fredrik Sjoholm, and Susan Zhu (2013).
39The industries with the highest shares of state ownership, Printing and Transport, were censored over concerns
regarding hiring incentives and geographic location. Both industries are relatively capital intensive, so that labor
market effects are of secondary importance.
40Bootstrapping the sample shows we can reject the hypothesis that the R2 of the wage regressions is higher than
the R2 of the availability regressions at the 95% confidence level in 13 of 16 industries.
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Figure 6.1: Explanatory Power of Worker Wages versus Availability by R2
6.1.2 Differences in Production Costs by Region
These first stage estimates are interesting in themselves, as the model then implies the unit cost
function for labor by region. The dispersion of estimated unit labor costs in the General Machines
industry are depicted in Figure 6.2. As General Machines is an industry with θT > 1, low cost
areas (light grey) represent areas with a combination of not only low wages, but deep pools of
similar types of workers.
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Figure 6.2: Geographic Dispersion of Unit Labor Costs: General Machines
Other features of regional factor markets might influence the relative quality of capital and
materials to labor, such as the depth of input/output markets, infrastructure or agglomerative forces.
To control for these features, we use Equation (4.3) to estimate regional capital and material quality
using the distance from the center of each firm’s county to the nearest large city, arriving at
̂lnκR = .315
(.096)
·Distance to City (per 100 km)+ Industry Fixed Effect,
̂lnµR = .236
(.123)
·Distance to City (per 100 km)+ Industry Fixed Effect.
The model primitives of the two stage estimation procedure across industries are summarized
in Table 2. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap stratified on industry and region, since
these estimates rely on the first stage estimates of structural model parameters. Table 2 displays the
estimated model primitives, showing a range of significantly different technologies θT and match
quality distributions through k. Table 2 also shows the second stage estimation results, where the
regional unit labor costs are calculated using regional data and the first stage estimates.41
41These second estimates include controls for the percentage of female and white collar workers, percentage of state
and foreign equity, share of revenues exported and the logarithm of the age of the firm.
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Table 2: Structural Model Estimates
Industry k θ αL αK αM
Beverage 2.12 (.38) 1.24 (.08) .18 (.04) .13 (.01) .62 (.04)
Electrical 2.60 (.15) 1.22 (.02) .17 (.01) .19 (.01) .42 (.01)
Food 1.59 (.36) 1.28 (.13) .15 (.06) .11 (.01) .65 (.06)
General Machines 2.50 (.14) 1.22 (.03) .17 (.02) .14 (.01) .55 (.01)
Iron & Steel 3.21 (.56) 1.00 (.06) .48 (.05) .09 (.01) .36 (.04)
Leather & Fur 2.15 (.70) 0.76 (.14) .07 (.05) .18 (.02) .53 (.06)
Metal Products 3.20 (.24) 1.10 (.03) .31 (.05) .13 (.01) .40 (.02)
Non-ferrous Metal 2.89 (.38) 1.15 (.05) .17 (.02) .10 (.01) .58 (.01)
Non-metal Products 2.02 (.16) 1.25 (.04) .14 (.08) .19 (.04) .45 (.05)
Paper 6.25 (3.8) 0.73 (.11) .09 (.02) .25 (.01) .41 (.01)
PC & AV 2.21 (.14) 1.41 (.04) .15 (.01) .19 (.01) .39 (.01)
Plastic 3.51 (.29) 1.08 (.03) .22 (.03) .17 (.01) .36 (.02)
Precision Tools 2.34 (.18) 1.43 (.05) .17 (.01) .18 (.01) .44 (.01)
Specific Machines 1.63 (.18) 1.43 (.07) .12 (.02) .20 (.01) .43 (.01)
Textile 3.73 (.36) 0.95 (.03) .01 (.04) .14 (.01) .59 (.03)
Wood 1.52 (.22) 1.62 (.17) .20 (.15) .14 (.03) .49 (.07)
Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.
While the capital coefficients may seem low, they are not out of line with other estimates which
specifically account for material inputs (e.g. Javorcik (2004)). For the specific case of China, there
are few comparable studies.42,43
In comparison with our findings, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) estimate the
total factor productivity of Chinese manufacturing firms in 1998-2007 using both the Olley–Pakes
and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer estimation methods. Their results suggest that there are decreasing
returns to scale in almost all industries in China. Their average sum of input intensities are 0.8 for
Olley-Pakes and 0.7 for Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer, and the average sum of input intensities in our
case is 0.8, in line with their higher range. Brandt et al. argue that measurement error and price
setting power are plausible explanations for the low estimates, although this issue is not addressed
in their paper due to the lack of firm-level price information (e.g. using the method of De Loecker
(2011)), a limitation we also face.
42Though not directly comparable, macroeconomic estimates include Chow (1993) and Ozyurt (2009) who find
higher capital coefficients. These studies do not account for materials. The most comparable study is Fleisher and
Wang (2004) who find microeconomic estimates for αK in the range of .40 to .50 (they do not differentiate between
capital and materials) and this compares favorably with the combined estimates of αK +αM in Table 2.
43We interpret the second stage estimates for Textiles with caution as capital and materials may have increased in
anticipation of the Multifibre Arrangement expiring in 2005, at the end of which Chinese exports grew by over 100%
in many categories. We have excluded the Apparel and Man-Made Fibre industries for this reason as they additionally
fail the model restriction β ≥ 0.
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6.1.3 Robustness: Instrumenting Manufacturing Labor Market Conditions
To address potential simultaneity issues between the relative demand for worker types and the
local supply or wages of workers, we instrument worker wages and availability (wR,i and aR,i)
by service sector wages, unemployment and workforce shares. While outside the scope of our
model, the idea here is that service sector workers are likely somewhat mobile into manufacturing
employment and thus service sector labor market conditions are likely correlated with those in
manufacturing. However, it is unlikely that aggregate labor market conditions in the service sector
would influence individual manufacturing firm’s workforce decisions beyond the effects they have
on manufacturing wages and availability. The results (see Appendix) do not drastically change
the point estimates of structural model parameters which are the basis for our subsequent analysis,
while the standard errors of structural estimates increase.
6.1.4 Robustness: Firm Size and Input Complementarity
As the optimal distribution of worker types within a firm might change with firm size, and because
different worker types might have different complementarities with other inputs such as capital
and materials, we have run two robustness checks of our first stage. The first check interacts each
worker type with the logarithm of the number of employees as a measure of firm size (reported in
the third and fourth column of Table A.10, see Appendix). The second check interacts each worker
type with capital and material intensity as measured by the logarithm of capital and materials
per worker (reported in the fifth and sixth column of Table A.10, see Appendix). The estimates
are robust to these extended specification: the changes in estimates are small and generally not
significant, as seen by comparing the results with the baseline specification of Table A.10 in the
first and second columns.
6.1.5 Robustness: Unobserved Regional Heterogeneity
One potential concern is bias in the second stage due to omitted variables which influence input
usage across regions separate from our model or observable controls. To address this, following
the productivity estimation literature and noting that among inputs, capital stocks are likely slower
to adjust to idiosyncratic differences (e.g. productivity, prices) than material and labor inputs, we
adopt a prefecture-industry level IV strategy. We instrument firm level unit labor costs and the
logarithm of material costs using the average unit labor cost and average (log) material costs at the
prefecture-industry level. The second stage estimates, which allow us to quantify the productivity
differences implied by the unit labor costs, are broadly similar (for a comparison, see Table A.11
in the Appendix).
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6.2 Implied Productivity Differences Across Firms
Table 3 quantifies the implied differences in unit labor costs. The cTR column displays the interquar-
tile (75%/25%) unit labor cost ratios by industry where unit labor costs have been calculated ac-
cording to the model, and range from about 30 to 80 percent cost differences within industry. The(
cTR
)αTL column takes into account substitution into non-labor inputs and range from about 3 to 12
percent. For example, consider two firms in General Machines at the 25th and 75th unit labor cost
percentile. If both firms have the same wage bill, the labor (L) available to the lower cost firm is
1.41 times greater than the higher cost firm. From Table 2 above, the estimated share of wages in
production is αTL = .17, so the lower cost firm will produce 1.41.17 = 1.06 times as much output
as the higher cost firm, holding all else constant.
Table 3: Intraindustry Unit Labor Cost Ratios
cTR
(
cTR
)αTL cTR (cTR)αTL
Industry 75/25 75/25 Industry 75/25 75/25
Beverage 1.51 1.08 Non-metal Products 1.42 1.06
Electrical 1.38 1.06 Paper 1.66 1.08
Food 1.81 1.09 PC & AV 1.44 1.03
General Machines 1.41 1.06 Plastic 1.35 1.07
Iron & Steel 1.34 1.15 Precision Tools 1.80 1.09
Leather & Fur 1.92 1.05 Specific Machines 1.99 1.09
Metal Products 1.33 1.05 Textile 1.37 1.00
Non-ferrous Metal 1.45 1.12 Wood 1.47 1.08
Table 3 indicates that the range of total unit costs faced by firms within the same industry
are indeed substantial, even after explicitly taking into account the technology θT and the ability
to substitute across several types of local workers. However, the second stage estimates indicate
these differences are attenuated by substitution into capital and materials. Thus, while differences
in regional markets indicate an interquartile range of 30-80% in unit cost differences, substitution
into other factors reduces this range to between 3-12%.
Table 4 displays similar calculations for capital and materials. The κα
T
K
R and µ
αTM
R columns
display the interquartile ratio of capital and material quality, ranging from about 1 to 3 percent
for capital and 2 to 5 percent for materials. Clearly estimated differences in labor markets are
substantially wider, in part due to the fact that we observe more information about workers than
types of capital or materials. Finally, the uTR column contains the differences in productivity implied
by regional cost differences as laid out in Section 2.4.
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Table 4: Intraindustry Capital, Material and Productivity Ratios
κα
T
K
R µ
αTM
R u
T
R κ
αTK
R µ
αTM
R u
T
R
Industry 75/25 75/25 75/25 Industry 75/25 75/25 75/25
Beverage 1.01 1.05 1.10 Non-metal Products 1.01 1.05 1.09
Electrical 1.02 1.04 1.07 Paper 1.02 1.04 1.10
Food 1.01 1.05 1.10 PC & AV 1.03 1.04 1.06
General Machines 1.01 1.04 1.08 Plastic 1.02 1.02 1.09
Iron & Steel 1.01 1.02 1.15 Precision Tools 1.02 1.03 1.08
Leather & Fur 1.01 1.03 1.08 Specific Machines 1.02 1.03 1.09
Metal Products 1.02 1.04 1.07 Textile 1.01 1.03 1.05
Non-ferrous Metal 1.01 1.03 1.12 Wood 1.01 1.04 1.08
Table 5 examines the variance of productivity by industry under the unit cost method (Column
1) compared to estimating output by a Cobb-Douglas combination of capital, materials and the
number of each worker type (Column 2). Column 3 of Table 5 shows the average percentage that
unexplained productivity is reduced per firm under the unit labor cost method.44 As shown by
the Table, the variance of unexplained productivity is reduced by about 6 to 30 percent once local
factor markets are explicitly accounted for, showing that this approach does indeed provide more
information about the determinants of firm productivity, with the relative importance of inputs
indicated by Tables 3 and 4.
Table 5: Percentage of Productivity Explained by Unit Cost Method
Unit Four Average Unit Four Average
Cost Types Percent Cost Types Percent
Industry σ2 σ2 Reduced Industry σ2 σ2 Reduced
Beverage .39 .54 .20 Non-metal Products .30 .43 .18
Electrical .50 .67 .14 Paper .44 .56 .12
Food .44 .59 .15 PC & AV .86 .94 .13
General Machines .34 .46 .17 Plastic .43 .65 .23
Iron & Steel .19 .66 .49 Precision Tools .56 .69 .14
Leather & Fur .43 .46 .04 Specific Machines .50 .61 .07
Metal Products .45 .61 .18 Textile .43 .45 .06
Non-ferrous Metal .32 .64 .30 Wood .31 .45 .19
We next quantify the net impact of these productivity differences across China by evaluating
the change in real income consumers would experience if labor markets were homogeneous.
44Most models used in production estimation assume perfect labor substitutability. Such models imply that, condi-
tional on wages, the local composition of the workforce is irrelevant for hiring. The approach of this paper incorporates
local factor supply and an empirical comparison with other models is presented in Appendix C.2.
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6.3 Consumer Welfare and Local Factor Market Costs
We now consider a hypothetical Chinese economy in which the distribution of workers and wages
across regions is equalized to the national average for each worker type. This is of course an
unrealistic assumption given the myriad influences of workers’ location decisions, but does provide
a benchmark to quantify the welfare impacts of homogenizing labor costs across China, and thus
the importance of factor markets.
Letting
{
uTR
}
be the estimated unit costs for China, PR the population of manufacturing workers
in region R and σT the share of consumption for each industry T as given by the 2002 Input-Output
Tables for China, Equation (3.3) can be computed for new unit costs
{
vTR
}
. To arrive at
{
vTR
}
,
we use our model parameter estimates while assuming that each region contains the nationally
averaged frequency of each worker type who receives the nationally averaged wage for their type.
This implies a more even distribution of worker types and wages that will reallocate expenditure
across regions and industries in potentially advantageous ways. In particular, more firms will enter
into areas where costs drop and will exit areas where costs rise. Calculation of Equation (3.3)
yields a real income gain of 1.33 percent under our baseline estimates, and 1.11 percent under our
instrumental variables estimates.45 This suggests that while factor market differences are large, if
firms relocate in response to these new conditions as in our model, the net welfare gains are in line
with other estimates of the gains from trade for large countries.
Since firms locate freely, the model predicts that these substantial cost differences drive eco-
nomic activity towards more advantageous locations, which we now examine.
6.4 Aggregate Firm Location
Per capita volumes of economic activity across regions are determined by Equation (3.7), which
states that relatively lower industry labor costs should attract relatively more firms to a region. Due
to a lack of panel data or instruments which might convincingly address confounding empirical
issues such as the role of Chinese industrial policy or the joint determination of firm and worker
location (beyond the relationships explained by the model), we interpret our results as a quantifica-
tion of model relationships, rather than a causal relationship. Table 6 summarizes estimates of this
relationship, controlling for regional distance to the nearest city (weighted by the share of log value
added in a region).46 A firm’s distance from a city may explain many factors, and above we have
seen firms closer to cities have relatively higher capital and material quality. Even controlling for
geography, the impact of advantageous labor markets still often remains. Whenever the relation-
45Since unit costs in fact vary at the firm level, we use the employment weighted average of firm unit costs in each
region-industry pair.
46Rizov and Zhang (2013) find that aggregate productivity is higher in regions with high population density, and the
theory of this paper implies productivity drives increased entry.
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ship between value added and labor costs is statistically significant, the relationship is negative, in
line with the model.47 While the point estimates vary, the median significant estimate is about -.7,
indicating a 10% increase in unit labor costs is associated with an 7% decrease in value added per
capita.
Table 6: Determinants of Regional (Log) Value Added per Capita
Std 100 km Std Std
Industry ln
(
cTR
)
Err to City Err Const Err Obs R2
Beverage -0.671*** (.241) -0.099 (.097) 18.74*** (2.936) 155 .035
Electrical 0.229 (.376) -0.769*** (.120) 8.84* (4.489) 166 .253
Food -0.555** (.219) -0.439*** (.113) 15.82*** (2.070) 171 .108
General Machines -0.408 (.351) -0.776*** (.120) 16.39*** (4.247) 195 .206
Iron & Steel -0.880 (.609) -0.426*** (.132) 15.07*** (2.396) 160 .080
Leather & Fur -1.052*** (.262) -0.554*** (.159) 23.60*** (3.177) 89 .300
Metal Products 0.049 (.383) -0.769*** (.113) 10.58*** (4.014) 157 .260
Non-ferrous Metal -2.096*** (.430) -0.534*** (.119) 28.64*** (3.610) 139 .199
Non-metal Products -0.423 (.281) -0.495*** (.070) 16.39*** (3.270) 259 .155
Paper -0.806*** (.200) -0.354*** (.121) 19.12*** (2.099) 159 .155
PC & AV -0.611** (.279) -1.037*** (.152) 19.66*** (3.506) 90 .318
Plastic 0.007 (.334) -0.671*** (.104) 10.66*** (3.773) 159 .209
Precision Tools -0.271 (.274) -0.677*** (.156) 13.51*** (3.109) 68 .170
Specific Machines -0.238 (.177) -0.452*** (.094) 14.01*** (2.190) 167 .121
Textile -0.623** (.292) -0.777*** (.099) 17.26*** (2.584) 186 .260
Wood -2.020*** (.313) -0.567*** (.165) 43.74*** (5.214) 133 .215
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
6.5 Labor Markets and China’s WTO Accession
As a counterfactual exercise, we consider the impact of improved access to US markets arising
from a structural shift in trade policy, namely China’s WTO membership in 2001. China’s perma-
nent normal trade relations with the US reduced the expected tariffs faced by Chinese exporters
in the face of potential non-renewal of MFN status by the US Congress (see Justin Pierce and
Peter Schott (2016) for more details).48 We measure the effect of this policy change on labor mar-
kets at the prefecture level, for all prefectures which have obtained ‘city’ status (207 prefectures)
and therefore appear in both the 1999 China City Statistical Yearbook and 1998 Annual Industrial
Survey. This allows us to aggregate the reduction in expected tariffs at the prefecture level using
the Bartik (1991) composition method. We construct a 4 digit ISIC tariff gap measure for each
47These results are robust if distance is unweighted, and to the inclusion of Economic Zone status.
48Pierce and Schott argue that US tariff gaps are plausibly exogenous to outcomes in China as 89% of the variation
in tariff gap is from the variation in Smoot-Hawley tariffs which were set 70 years prior to China’s WTO accession.
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industry T , TariffGapT ,
49 and weight the impact of TariffGapT by the employment share of each
industry in prefecture R in 1998 to arrive at the regional treatment
TariffGapRegionR ≡∑
T
Employment ShareT R ·TariffGapT .
We use TariffGapRegionR to predict changes in the population share of worker types in each region
between 2000 and 2005 due to WTO accession using local linear estimates as presented in Figure
A.1 of the Appendix.50
We use the predicted population share changes to predict the skill distribution of prefectures if
China had not acceded to the WTO. We then recalculate the unit labor costs and productivity for
each firm and compare the dispersion of these counterfactuals with the actual dispersion as pre-
sented in Table A.12 of Appendix F. While the interquartile unit cost ratios do vary slightly under
the two scenarios, the interquartile productivity ratios are essentially identical across the two sce-
narios.51 There are only slightly larger differences at the 90/10 and 95/5 percentiles, indicating that
while skill distributions of workers were effected by China’s WTO accession, relative productivity
distributions of firms were essentially unchanged.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the importance of local supply characteristics in determining firm input usage
and productivity. To do so, a theory and empirical method are developed to identify firm input
demand across industries and heterogeneous labor markets. The model derives labor demand as
driven by the local distribution of wages and available skills. Firm behavior in general equilibrium
is derived, and determines firm location as a function of regional costs. This results in an estimator
which can be easily implemented in two steps. The first step exploits differences in firm hiring
patterns across distinct regional factor markets to recover firm labor demand by type, and similarly,
differences in regional factor quality. These estimates quantify local unit labor costs and combine
otherwise disparate data sets on firms and labor markets into a unified framework. The second step
introduces local factor market costs into production function estimation. Both steps characterize
the impact of local market conditions on firm behavior through recovery of model primitives. This
is of particular interest when explaining the relative productivity or location of firms, especially in
49Defined as the simple average of HS- 6 product-level tariff gaps averaged to the 4 digit ISIC level, using the UN
Statistics concordance.
50Note we have no wage data by type for the year 2000 so have no similar way of performing a counterfactual for
wages by type.
51With the exception of the Iron and Steel sector which has an interquartile productivity ratio of 1.15 vs 1.14 under
trade policy uncertainty.
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settings where local characteristics are highly dissimilar.
Applying the model framework to China, which possesses a large number of distinct and var-
ied factor markets shows this approach uncovers substantial determinants of firm heterogeneity.
Estimates imply an interquartile difference in labor costs of 30 to 80 percent and productivity dif-
ferences of 3 to 12 percent. Differences in capital and material quality explain similar interquartile
differences. The results illustrate that local factor market conditions explain substantial differences
in firm workforce composition, input use and productivity. This is underscored by the estimate that
complete homogenization of labor markets would lead to a 1.33 percent increase in real income
for Chinese consumers as firms adapt to local factor market conditions. In addition, the variance
of unexplained productivity is reduced by 6 to 30 percent compared to a standard estimation ap-
proach which does not account for local factor markets. Modeling a firm’s local environment yields
substantial insights into production patterns that are quantitatively important.
The importance of local factor markets for understanding firm behavior suggests new dimen-
sions for policy analysis. For instance, regions with labor markets which generate lower unit labor
costs tend to attract higher levels of firm activity within an industry. As unit labor costs depend
on rather the distribution of wages and worker types that represent substitution options, this yields
a deeper view of how educational policy or flows of different worker types impact firms. For this
reason, work evaluating wage determination could be enriched by taking this approach.52 Taken
as a whole, the results show that policy changes which influence the composition of regional labor
markets will likely have sizable effects on firm productivity and location. Finally, the substantial
differences within industry suggest that at the regional level, inherent comparative advantages exist
which policymakers might leverage.53
Furthermore, as pointed out by Ottaviano and Peri (2013), little is known about the dynamic
relationships between labor markets and firm behavior, and this paper provides both a general
equilibrium theory and structural estimation strategy to evaluate these linkages.54 Having seen
that cost and productivity differences inherent in local factor markets are potentially large, our
approach could be of use in evaluating trade offs between regional policies or ongoing trends
across regions. Finally, nothing precludes the application of this paper’s approach beyond China,
and it is suitable for analyzing regions which exhibit a high degree of labor market heterogeneity.
Further work could leverage or extend the approach of combining firm, census and geographic data
52There is large literature following Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999). For instance, Van Biesebroeck
(2011) find the usual relationship between wages and marginal productivity breaks down in less developed countries.
Investigating this relationship using our approach could shed light on regional determinants of labor market clearing,
for instance evaluating gender differentials as in Dong and Zhang (2009).
53For a discussion of broader policy implications of regional differences in production, see Luger and Evans (1988).
54Early results suggest firm entry is responsive to labor market changes, especially in manufacturing (Olney, 2013),
and labor costs are known to strongly influence vertical production networks (Hanson, Mataloni Jr, and Slaughter,
2005).
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to better understand the role of local factor markets on firm behavior.
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Appendix
The organization of the Appendix is as follows: Section A contains proofs of results discussed
in the main text. Section B evaluates the efficacy of the reduced form model estimator. Section
C contains more detail regarding model estimates. Three supplemental appendices are provided
for online publication: Section G contains additional details on the model solution and properties.
Section H contains supplemental summary statistics and empirical results.
A Proofs
Proposition. If βT > 0 then it is optimal for a firm to hire all types of workers.
Proof. Let cTR denote a firm’s unit labor cost when all worker types are hired, and cˇ
T
R the unit labor
cost if a subset of types T ⊂ {1, . . .S} is hired. For the result, we require that cTR ≤ cˇTR for all T.
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Considering a firm’s cost minimization problem when T are the only types available shows with
Equation (2.4) that
cˇTR =
[
∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)]θT /βT
](βT /θT)/(1−k)
.
Considering then that
cTR/cˇ
T
R =
[
1+
(
∑
i/∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i ]θT /βT /∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i ]θT /βT
)](βT /θT)/(1−k)
,
clearly cTR ≤ cˇTR so long as βT/θT (1− k)≤ 0, which holds for βT > 0 since k > 1.
Proposition. An equilibrium wage vector exists which clears each regional labor market.
Proof. What is required is to exhibit a wage vector {wR,i} that ensures Equation (3.6) holds. To do
so, first note that the resource clearing conditions determine wages, provided an exogenous vector
of unit labor costs
{
cTR
}
. Since all prices are nominal, WLOG we normalize I= 1 in the following
Lemma. There is a wage function that uniquely solves (3.6) given unit labor costs.
Proof. Formally, we need to exhibitW such that
aR,i =WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})−1
∑
t
α tLσ
t (ctR)k/β t−1
WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})1−k
aR,i (mti)
k
f (k−1)

θ t/β t
∀R, i.
Fix
{
cT
′
R′
}
and define hR,i (x)≡∑t α tLσ t (ctR)k/β
t−1 (x1−kaR,i (mti) k/ f (k−1))θ t/β t , gR,i (x)≡ aR,ix.
For the result we require a unique x s.t. gR,i (x) = hR,i (x). gR,i is strictly increasing and ranges from
0 to ∞, while hR,i (x) is strictly decreasing, and ranges from ∞ to 0, so x exists and is unique.
Of course, unit labor costs are not exogenous as in the Lemma, but rather depend on endoge-
nous wages {wR,i}. However, the lemma does show that the following mapping:
{wR,i} 7→
Equation 2.4
{
cTR ({wR,i})
} 7→
Lemma
W
({
cTR ({wR,i})
})
,
which starts at one wage vector {wR,i} and ends at another wage vector W is well defined. The
result follows if we can show the function
{
cTR ◦W
({
cTR
})}
, where cTR is the unit cost function of
Equation (2.4), has a fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
and soW
({
ĉTR
})
is a solution to Equation (3.6).
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We first show that any equilibrium wage vector must lie in a strictly positive, compact set
×R,i
[
wR,i,wR,i
]
. From (3.6), Hθ
T
R,i /Σ jH
θT
R, j ∈ [0,1] so wR,i ≤ wR,i ≡ ∑t α tLσ t/aR,i. Let
bR ≡mini ∑t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
) k)θ t/β t /∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
) k]θ t/β t aR,i,
and we will show that a lower bound for equilibrium wages is wR ≡
[
bR, . . . , bR
]
for each R.
Consider that forW evaluated at
{
cTR (wR)
}
,
WR,i =∑
t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
) k (WR,i/wR)1−k)θ t/β t /∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
) k]θ t/β t aR,i. (A.1)
Evaluating Equation (A.1), if WR,i ≤ wR then WR,i ≥ wR, and otherwise, WR,i ≥ wR so {wR}
is a lower bound for W
({
cTR (wR)
})
. Since necessarily any equilibrium wages wˆR must satisfy
W
({
cTR (wˆR)
})
= {wˆR}, W is increasing in
{
cTR
}
, and cTR (wR) is increasing in wR, we have
{wˆR} =W
({
cTR (wˆR)
}) ≥W({cTR (wR)}) ≥ {wR}. In conclusion, all equilibrium wages must
lie in ×R,i
[
wR,i,wR,i
]
.
Now define a strictly positive, compact domain for
{
cTR
}
, ×R
[
cTR ,c
T
R
]
, by
cTR ≡ inf×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) , c
T
R ≡ sup
×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) .
Now consider the mapping C
({
cTR
})≡ {cTR ◦W({cTR})} on ×R [cTR ,cTR], which is continuous on
this domain. By above, WR,i
({
cTR
}) ≤ wR,i for each R, i so C({cTR}) ≤ {cTR}. Also by above,
C
({
cTR
})≥ {cTR ◦W({cTR (wR)})}≥ {cTR ({wR})}= {cTR}. Thus C maps ×R [cTR ,cTR] into itself
and by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
, which impliesW
({
ĉTR
})
is
an equilibrium wage vector.
Proposition. Regions with lower factor costs have more firms per capita. In particular, if FTR
denotes the mass of firms per capita in region R, industry T then
ln
(
FTR/FTR′
)
= αTK ln(κR′/κR)+α
T
M ln(µR′/µR)+α
T
L ln
(
cTR′/c
T
R
)
. (A.2)
Proof. This follows quickly from the definition of the mass of firms per capita, FTR =MTR ·G
(
ηTR
)
/PR,
since
Firms per Capita, R to R′ :
MTR ·G
(
ηTR
)
/PR
MTR′ ·G
(
ηTR′
)
/PR′
=
uTR′
uTR
=
(
κR′
κR
)αTK (µR′
µR
)αTM(cTR′
cTR
)αTL
.
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B Model Simulation and Estimator Viability
A model simulation was constructed using parameters given in Table A.1. In the simulation, firms
maximize profits conditional on local market conditions, and applying the estimator above pro-
duces Tables A.2a and A.2b. The Estimate column contains results while the model values are
reported in the Predicted column. The estimates are very close to the predicted values. Figure A.1
further confirms this by plotting the simulated and predicted differences in the share of workers
hired. For ease of comparison, Figure A.1 plots regional frequencies along the horizontal axis and
(linearly) normalized wages for each worker type. As the Figure suggests, the R2 in both cases are
high: .99 for the first stage and .97 for the second stage.
Figure A.1: Simulation Fit
Table A.1: Simulation details
Variable Description Value
θT Technological parameter. 2
k Pareto shape parameter. 1.5
{mi} Human capital shifters. {4,8,12,16,20}
{wR,i} Regional wages by type. ∼LogNormal µ = (12,24,36,48,60), σ = 1/3.
{aR,i} Regional type frequencies. ∼LogNormal µ = (.4, .3, .15, .1, .05), σ = 1/3,
scaled so that frequencies sum to one.
K, M Firm capital and materials. ∼LogNormal µ = 1, σ = 1.
L Level of L employed by firm. Profit maximizing given K, M and region.
αM,αK ,αL Production Parameters. αM = 1/6, αK = 1/3, αL = 1/2.
Control Misc variable for output. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = 1.
Coeff Exponent on Control. Control Coeff= pi .{
ω j
}
Firm idiosyncratic wage costs. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = .1.
Sample: 200 regions with 20 firms per region, with errors ∼LogNormal(µ = 0, σ = 1/2).
39
Table A.2: Simulation Results
(a) Simulation First Stage Estimates: Technology and Human Capital
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
{lnaR,i}
(
θT/β T
)
3.912 .0019 4
{lnwR,i}
(−k/β T ) -2.922 .0021 -3
Dummy (Type = 1)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm1/m5) -9.376 .0057 -9.657
Dummy (Type = 2)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm2/m5) -5.295 .0045 -5.498
Dummy (Type = 3)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm3/m5) -2.950 .0031 -3.065
Dummy (Type = 4)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm4/m5) -1.274 .0024 -1.339
(b) Simulation Second Stage Estimates: Production Parameters
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
lnM αM/(1−αL) .3298 .0079 .3333
lnK αK/(1−αL) .6680 .0080 .6667
lncRT −αL/(1−αL) -.9303 .0748 -1
Control Control Coeff 3.148 .0079 3.141
C Model Estimates: Baseline and Instrumental Variables
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Table A.4: First Stage Estimates II
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Table A.5: First Stage IV Estimates I
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Table A.6: First Stage IV Estimates II
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Table A.7: Hiring Model Primitive IV Estimates
Industry k θ Industry k θ
Beverage 2.18 (.55) 1.16 (.11) Non-ferrous Metal 2.35 (.20) 1.19 (.03)
Electrical 2.84 (.20) 1.18 (.03) Non-metal Products 17.0 (5.2) 0.51 (.29)
Food 1.10 (.51) 1.39 (1.1) Paper 2.24 (.16) 1.39 (.04)
General Machines 2.72 (.17) 1.18 (.03) Plastic 3.69 (.33) 1.07 (.03)
Iron & Steel 6.01 (2.8) 0.91 (.07) PC & AV 2.05 (.22) 1.48 (.09)
Leather & Fur 1.92 (.73) 0.73 (.18) Specific Machines 1.70 (.19) 1.44 (.08)
Precision Tools 3.93 (.44) 1.02 (.03) Textile 4.21 (.65) 0.88 (.04)
Metal Products 4.25 (.63) 1.07 (.05) Wood 2.06 (.3) 1.33 (.09)
Bootstrapped Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
C.1 Residual Comparison: Unit Labor Costs vs Substitutable Labor
Of particular interest for work on productivity are the residuals remaining after the second esti-
mation step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm productivity. Figure A.1 contrasts
unexplained productivity (estimation residuals) when unit labor costs are used with estimates that
measure labor by including the employment of each worker type. Examining the 45 degree line
also plotted in the Figure, a general pattern emerges: above average firms under the employment
measure are slightly less productive under the unit cost approach, while below average firms are
more productive. This suggests that a more detailed analysis of the role of local factor markets
may substantially alter interpretation of differences in firm productivity.
Figure A.1: Productivity: Unit Labor Costs vs Total Employment (General Machines)
C.2 Comparison with Conventional Labor Measures
The estimates above reflect a procedure using regional variation to recover the unit cost of labor.
Often, such information is not incorporated into production estimation. Instead, the number of
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employees or total wage bill are used to capture the effective labor available to a firm. The mean
of the second stage estimates using these labor measures are contrasted with unit cost method in
Table A.8 (full results in Table A.19 of the Supplemental Appendix). The production coefficients
using the total wage bill or total employment are very similar, reflecting the high correlation of
these variables. However, both measures mask regional differences in factor markets. Once local
substitution patterns are taken into account explicitly, substantial differences emerge.55 Most no-
tably, the capital share tends to be higher under the approach of this paper, while the labor share is
substantially lower.
Table A.8: Second Stage Estimates vs Homogeneous Labor Estimates
Unit Labor Cost Total Wage Bill Total Employment
αL αK αM αL αK αM αL αK αM
Average 0.18 0.16 0.48 0.28 0.09 0.56 0.28 0.09 0.58
Pushing this comparison further, Table A.9 predicts the propensity to export of firms by resid-
ual firm productivity. The first column shows the results under the unit cost method. The second
and third columns show the results when labor is measured as perfectly substitutable (either by em-
ployment of each type or wages). Note that in all cases, regional and industry effects are controlled
for. The Table illustrates that productivity estimates which account for regional factor markets are
almost twice as important in predicting exports as the other measures. Section H.4 of the Appendix
shows that similar results hold when examining sales growth and three year survival rate: produc-
tivity under the unit cost approach is more important in predicting firm performance, suggesting
the other measures conflate the role of advantageous factor markets with productivity.
Table A.9: Explaining Propensity to Export with Productivity
Export Dummy (2005)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.0260***
(0.00430)
Productivity under L = 4 Types 0.0140***
(0.00248)
Productivity under L = Wage Bill 0.0177***
(0.00262)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127,082 127,082 127,082
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.204
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
55The residuals remaining after the second estimation step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm pro-
ductivity, are compared in Appendix C.1.
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D Robustness Checks: Firm Size and Input Complementarity
Table A.10: Firm Size and Complementarity Controls
Type*ln(K/Emp) &
Baseline Type*ln(Emp) Type*ln(M/Emp)
Industry k θ k θ k θ
Beverage 2.12 (.38) 1.24 (.08) 2.09 (.39) 1.24 (.09) 2.11 (.41) 1.22 (.10)
Electrical 2.60 (.15) 1.22 (.02) 2.57 (.15) 1.22 (.02) 2.47 (.16) 1.23 (.03)
Food 1.59 (.36) 1.28 (.13) 1.57 (.36) 1.27 (.15) 1.60 (.38) 1.25 (.16)
General Machines 2.50 (.14) 1.22 (.03) 2.41 (.14) 1.23 (.03) 2.52 (.17) 1.21 (.04)
Iron & Steel 3.21 (.56) 1.00 (.06) 3.16 (.41) 1.07 (.09) 3.16 (.44) 1.02 (.08)
Leather & Fur 2.15 (.70) 0.76 (.14) 2.36 (.69) 0.82 (.11) 2.09 (.72) 0.78 (.10)
Metal Products 3.20 (.24) 1.10 (.03) 3.12 (.23) 1.11 (.03) 3.18 (.25) 1.07 (.04)
Non-ferrous Metal 2.89 (.38) 1.15 (.05) 2.66 (.35) 1.19 (.06) 2.79 (.33) 1.17 (.07)
Non-metal Products 2.02 (.16) 1.25 (.04) 1.98 (.16) 1.28 (.04) 2.08 (.17) 1.21 (.05)
Paper 6.25 (3.8) 0.73 (.11) 5.89 (1.6) 0.71 (.15) 6.13 (1.8) 0.74 (.16)
PC & AV 2.21 (.14) 1.41 (.04) 2.19 (.14) 1.41 (.04) 2.19 (.15) 1.42 (.06)
Plastic 3.51 (.29) 1.08 (.03) 3.41 (.29) 1.08 (.03) 3.57 (.25) 1.06 (.04)
Precision Tools 2.34 (.18) 1.43 (.05) 2.41 (.19) 1.38 (.05) 2.39 (.22) 1.41 (.05)
Specific Machines 1.63 (.18) 1.43 (.07) 1.69 (.18) 1.37 (.06) 1.67 (.19) 1.39 (.07)
Textile 3.73 (.36) 0.95 (.03) 3.59 (.26) 0.97 (.03) 3.65 (.27) 0.98 (.05)
Wood 1.52 (.22) 1.62 (.17) 1.44 (.21) 1.67 (.21) 1.48 (.20) 1.59 (.19)
Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.
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E Robustness: Unobserved Regional Heterogeneity
Table A.11: Prefecture-Industry Level Instruments Using Prefecture Averages of Unit Labor Costs
and Materials
Baseline Instruments
Industry αL αK αM αL αK αM
Beverage .18 (.04) .13 (.01) .62 (.04) .20 (.06) .12 (.03) .64 (.06)
Electrical .17 (.01) .19 (.01) .42 (.01) .16 (.03) .20 (.02) .45 (.03)
Food .15 (.06) .11 (.01) .65 (.06) .14 (.07) .13 (.02) .60 (.08)
General Machines .17 (.02) .14 (.01) .55 (.01) .21 (.05) .12 (.03) .59 (.04)
Iron & Steel .48 (.05) .09 (.01) .36 (.04) .52 (.08) .09 (.02) .38 (.06)
Leather & Fur .07 (.05) .18 (.02) .53 (.06) .06 (.05) .18 (.04) .57 (.07)
Metal Products .31 (.05) .13 (.01) .40 (.02) .30 (.03) .13 (.03) .48 (.05)
Non-ferrous Metal .17 (.02) .10 (.01) .58 (.01) .14 (.10) .12 (.02) .59 (.06)
Non-metal Products .14 (.08) .19 (.04) .45 (.05) .12 (.05) .18 (.02) .46 (.04)
Paper .09 (.02) .25 (.01) .41 (.01) .09 (.03) .22 (.05) .45 (.07)
PC & AV .15 (.01) .19 (.01) .39 (.01) .16 (.03) .17 (.02) .38 (.03)
Plastic .22 (.03) .17 (.01) .36 (.02) .22 (.04) .14 (.02) .42 (.04)
Precision Tools .17 (.01) .18 (.01) .44 (.01) .21 (.06) .15 (.03) .43 (.05)
Specific Machines .12 (.02) .20 (.01) .43 (.01) .14 (.04) .19 (.03) .49 (.03)
Textile .01 (.04) .14 (.01) .59 (.03) .01 (.05) .16 (.02) .55 (.05)
Wood .20 (.15) .14 (.03) .49 (.07) .23 (.16) .15 (.04) .48 (.10)
Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.
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F WTO Accession Counterfactual Graphs
Figure A.1: Predicted Type Share Changes By Prefecture Due to WTO Accession
Table A.12: Intraindustry Unit Labor Cost Ratios: Baseline vs No WTO Accession
Baseline No Accession Baseline No Accession
cTR c
T
R c
T
R c
T
R
Industry 75/25 75/25 Industry 75/25 75/25
Beverage 1.51 1.52 Non-metal Products 1.42 1.42
Electrical 1.38 1.37 Paper 1.66 1.68
Food 1.81 1.83 PC & AV 1.44 1.44
General Machines 1.41 1.40 Plastic 1.35 1.35
Iron & Steel 1.34 1.32 Precision Tools 1.80 1.80
Leather & Fur 1.92 1.95 Specific Machines 1.99 1.99
Metal Products 1.33 1.32 Textile 1.37 1.37
Non-ferrous Metal 1.45 1.43 Wood 1.47 1.48
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G Supplemental Derivations
G.1 Derivation of Region-Technology Budget Shares
The expressions which fix the cutoff cost draw ηTR and mass of entryMTR can be neatly summarized
by defining the mass of entrants who produce, M˜TR , and the (locally weighted) average cost draw
in each region, η˜TR :
M˜TR ≡MTRG
(
ηTR
)
, η˜TR ≡
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTz u
T
R
(
UTR
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
.
Using the profit maximizing price PTR j and combining Equations (2.9) and (3.1) then yields the
equilibrium quantity produced,
QTR j = ρI
(
uTRη j
(
UTR /σ
T
R
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
/uTRη j∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (G.1)
Aggregating revenues using Equation (G.1) shows that each consumer’s budget share allocated to
region R and industry T is
Consumer Budget Share for R,T :
(
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (G.2)
Consequently, since free entry implies expected profits must equal expected fixed costs, the mass
of entrantsMTR solves the implicit form56
(1−ρ)I
((
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr
)
=MTRuTR
(
feG
(
ηTR
)
+Fe
)
, (G.3)
while the equilibrium cost cutoffs ηTR solve the zero profit condition57
(1−ρ)I(σTR )1/(1−ρ)(uTRηTR (UTR )1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1) = uTR fe∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (G.4)
56To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
η˜TR
}
, and
{
ηTR
}
, necessarily MTR ∈ ATR ≡[
0,(1−ρ)I/uTRFe
]
. Existence follows from the Brouwer fixed point theorem on the domain×R,T ATR for H
({
M˜TR
})
≡
(1−ρ)I
((
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑t,r (σ tr)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr)/uTR ( feG(ηTR)+Fe) .
57To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
MT ′R′
}
and
{
UTR
}
, the LHS ranges from 0 to ∞ as ηTR varies,
while the RHS is bounded away from 0 and ∞ when min
{
η˜ trG
(
η tr
)}
> 0. η˜TR G
(
ηTR
)
> 0 follows from inada type
conditions on goods from each T and R.
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Equations (G.3) and (G.4) fix ηTR since combining them shows
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTz /η
T
R
)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
= 1+Fe/ feG
(
ηTR
)
.
In particular, ηTR does not vary by region or technology. Thus, Equation (G.4) shows that
UTR u
T
R/σ
T
R =
[
(1−ρ)I/ fe∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr
]1−ρ
/
(
ηTR
)ρ
. (G.5)
where the RHS does not vary by region or technology. Combining this equation with (3.1) shows
QTR j = Q
T ′
R′ j for all (T,R) and (T
′,R′), so that MTRuTR/σTR =MT
′
R′u
T ′
R′/σ
T ′
R′ . At the same time, using
Equation (G.5) reduces (G.2) to
Consumer Budget Share for R,T : MTRuTR/∑
t,r
Mtrutr = σTR /∑
t,r
σ tr = σ
T
R .
Since ∑t,rσ tr = 1, each region and industry receive a share σTR of consumer expenditure.
G.2 Regional Variation in Input Use
Equation (4.1) specifies the relative shares of each type of worker hired. Since input markets are
competitive, firms and workers take regional labor market characteristics as given. As characteris-
tics such as wages worker availability and human capital vary, the share of each labor type hired
differs across regions. These differences can be broken up into direct and indirect effects. Direct
effects ignore substitution by holding the unit labor cost c˜RT constant, while indirect effects mea-
sure how regional differences give rise to substitution. The direct effects are easy to read off of
Equation (4.1), showing:
Direct Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i|c˜RT constant =−k/βT < 0, (G.6)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i|c˜RT constant = θT/βT > 0, (G.7)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnmTi
∣∣
c˜RT constant
= kθT/βT > 0. (G.8)
These direct effects have the obvious signs: higher wages (wR,i ↑) discourage hiring a particular
type while greater availability (aR,i ↑) and higher human capital (mT,i ↑) encourage hiring that type.
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The indirect effects of substitution through c˜RT are less obvious as seen by
d ln c˜kRT/d lnwR,i =
(
k/θT
)[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT > 0, (G.9)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnaR,i =−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT < 0, (G.10)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnm
T
i =−k
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT < 0. (G.11)
Thus, the indirect effects counteract the direct effects through substitution. To see the total of the
direct and indirect effects, define the Type-Region-Technology coefficients χi,R,T :
χi,R,T ≡ 1−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT .
Investigation shows that each χi,R,T is between zero and one. Combining Equations (G.6-G.8) and
Equations (G.9-G.11) shows that the direct effect dominates since
Total Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i =
[−k/βT ]χi,R,T < 0, (G.12)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i =
[
θT/βT
]
χi,R,T > 0, (G.13)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnmTi =
[
kθT/βT
]
χi,R,T > 0. (G.14)
Equations (G.12-G.14) summarize the relationship between regions and labor market charac-
teristics. For small changes in labor market characteristics, the log share of a type hired in linear
in log characteristics with a slope determined by model parameters and a regional shifter χi,R,T .
These (local) isoquants for the share of type i workers hired in region R are depicted in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Local isoquants for Share of Workers Hired
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G.3 Regional Variation in Theory: Isoquants
Equations (G.12-G.14) also characterize local isoquants of hiring the same share of a type across
regions. It is immediate that for small changes in market characteristics,
(
∆w, ∆a, ∆m
)
, the
share of a type hired is constant so long as
−(k/θT)∆w/wR,i+∆a/aR,i+ k∆m/mTi = 0.
For instance, firms in regions R and R′ will hire the same fraction of type i workers for small
differences in characteristics (∆w,∆a) so long as
∆w/∆a =
(
θT/k
)
wR,i/aR,i. (G.15)
By itself, an increase in type i wages ∆w would cause firms to hire a lower share of type i workers
as indicated by the direct effect. However, Equation (G.15) shows that firms would keep the same
share of type i workers if the availability ∆a increases concurrently so that Equation (G.15) holds.
G.4 Derivation of Unit Labor Costs
Local trade offs and the dependence on the regional labor supply characteristics aR and wR is made
explicit by considering the technology and region specific cost function CT (H|aR,wR), defined by
CT ≡min
N,h
N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,i (1−Ψ(hi))+ f cTR
]
where Hi = NaR,imTi
∫ ∞
hi
hdΨ ∀i. (G.16)
Here Ψ denotes the CDF of match quality. Letting µi denote the Lagrange multiplier for each of
the S cost minimization constraints, the first order conditions for {hi} imply µi =wR,i/mTi hi, while
the choice of N implies
CT (H|aR,wR) =∑
i
µiHi = N∑wR,iaR,i
∫ ∞
hi
h/hidΨ. (G.17)
Equation (G.17) shows that the multipliers µi are the marginal cost contribution per skill unit to Hi
of the last type i worker hired. The cost function CT implies the unit labor cost of L in region R is
Unit Labor Cost Problem : cTR ≡minH C
T (H|aR,wR) subject to L = 1. (G.18)
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Under the parameterization Ψ(h) = 1−h−k, Equations (2.1) become
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi h1−ki ·N. (G.19)
From the FOCs above, wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = Hθ
T
i /∑ j H
θT
j , and L = 1 =
(
∑ j Hθ
T
j
)1/θT
so
hi = wR,iH
1−θT
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR) . (G.20)
Substitution now yields
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi
(
wR,iH1−θ
T
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR)
)1−k ·N. (G.21)
Further reduction and the definition of βT shows that
Hβ
T
i = H
θT+k−kθT
i = aR,ik/(k−1) ·
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i CT (H|aR,wR)k−1 N. (G.22)
Again using
(
∑ j Hθ
T
j
)1/θT
= 1 then shows
1 =∑
i
[
aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi kw1−kR,i
(
cTR
)k−1
N
]θT /βT
. (G.23)
From the definition of the cost function we have (substituting in G.20)
cTR = N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,ih−ki + f c
T
R
]
=∑
i
wR,i ((k−1)/k)Hi/mTi hi+N f cTR .
Therefore from wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = Hθ
T
i it follows
1 =∑
i
(k−1)/k ·HθTi +N f = (k−1)/k+N f ,
and therefore N = 1/ f k. Now from Equation (G.23), cTR is seen to be Equation (2.4).
G.5 Derivation of Employment Shares
Combining Equations (G.20), (G.22) and N = 1/ f k shows
hi = a
(1−θT)/βT
R,i
(
mTi
)−θT /βT w1/βTR,i (cTR)−1/βT /( f (k−1))(1−θT)/βT . (G.24)
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Let ATR,i be the number of type i workers hired to make L = 1, exclusive of fixed search costs. By
definition, ATR,i = N|L=1 ·aR,i (1−Ψ(hi)) = aR,ih−ki / f k. Using Equation (G.24),
ATR,i = k
−1 (k−1)aθT /βTR,i
(
mTi
) kθT /βT w−k/βTR,i (cTR)k/βT ((k−1) f )−θT /βT .
Labor is also consumed by the fixed search costs which consist of N|L=1 · f = 1/k labor units.
Therefore, if A˜TR,i denotes the total number of type i workers hired to make L = 1, necessarily
A˜TR,i = A
T
R,i + A˜
T
R,i/k so A˜
T
R,i = k (k−1)−1 ATR,i, and the total number of type i workers hired in
region R using technology T is LTR A˜
T
R,i. The total number of employees in R, T is ∑i LTR A˜TR,i =
LTR
(
cTR
)k/βT (c˜TR)(1−k)θT /βT , where c˜TR denotes the unit labor cost function at wages{wk/(k−1)θTR,i }58.
G.6 Derivation of Indirect Utility
First, note that within an industry T and region R, the quantity a firm j produces relative to quantity
QTR that the highest cost firm produces is Q
T
R j/Q
T
R j =
(
ηTR/η j
)1/(1−ρ)
. From the condition that the
highest cost firm makes zero profits, QTR = ρ fe/(1−ρ)ηTR , and consequently
QTR j = ρ fe
(
ηTR
)ρ/(1−ρ)
/(1−ρ)(η j)1/(1−ρ) .
Since the share of income spent on industry T and region R, σTR I, must equal total costs,
σTR I= uTRMTR
[∫ ηTR
0
ρ fe
(
ηTR
)ρ/(1−ρ)
/(1−ρ)(η j)1/(1−ρ)+ fedG( j)+Fe] .
Free entry and constant markups also implies that entry costs uTRFe must equal expected profits, so
uTR
[∫ ηTR
0
fe
(
ηTR
)ρ/(1−ρ)
/
(
η j
)1/(1−ρ)− fedG( j)]= uTRFe.
Combining these expressions shows
MTR = σTR I/uTR
[∫ ηTR
0
fe
(
ηTR
)ρ/(1−ρ)
/(1−ρ)(η j)1/(1−ρ) dG( j)] .
58Formally c˜TR ≡minH CT
(
H|aR,
{
w−k/θ
T (1−k)
R,i
})
subject to L = 1.
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Finally, expanding the expression for welfare (say, W ) and using ∑T,RσTR = 1, we have
expW =∏
T,R
(
MTR
)σTR (∫ ηTR
0
(
QTR j
)ρ
dG( j)
)σTR
= ρρ (1−ρ)1−ρ f ρ−1e
(
η11
)−ρ∫ η110 (η j)ρ/(ρ−1) dG( j)∫ η11
0
(
η j
)1/(ρ−1) dG( j)
 · I ·∏
T,R
(
σTR
uTR
)σTR
.
Note that since ηTR depends only on fe,Fe and G, only the term I ·∏T,R
(
σTR /uTR
)σTR can vary with
regional endowments.
G.7 Limited Factor Price Equalization
Since workers are imperfectly substitutable, they induce spillovers within firms, and consequently
are not paid their marginal product.59 Mirroring this, the equation for unit labor costs shows that
regions with different skill distributions, say region R and R′, typically cannot have both cTR = cTR′
and wR = wR′ . However, factor price equalization for labor holds in a limited fashion. Summing
across types in (3.6) implies
Average Wages : ∑
i
aR,iwR,i =∑
T
αTL σ
T I,
so average wages are constant across regions. This is summarized as
Proposition 4. Average wages are equalized across regions.
Proposition 4 shows that while the model allows for heterogeneity of wages by worker type,
general equilibrium forces still imply that factor price equalization holds on average. As is well
known, this prediction will rarely hold in any real world setting, but can be understood in terms of
factor augmenting technology differences (e.g. Trefler (1993)).
H Supplemental Summary Statistics and Empirical Results
UNICEF suggests that the typical Chinese primary school entrance age is 7 (Source: childinfo.org).
Compulsory education lasts nine years (primary and secondary school) and ends around age six-
teen. Figure A.1 illustrates the average years of schooling for the Chinese labor force, while Table
A.13 displays the frequency of each worker type and their average monthly wages by Province.
59Such spillovers are internalized by firms in the model. The extent to which spillovers might also occur across
industries is beyond the scope of this study, however see Moretti (2004) for evidence in the US context.
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Figure A.1: Chinese Educational Attainment (2005)
Table A.13: Educational and Wage Distribution by Province (2005)
Province Fraction of Labor Force by Education Avg Monthly Wage by Education
≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College ≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College
(Female) (Male) HS or Above (Female) (Male) HS or Above
Anhui 0.296 0.485 0.155 0.063 581 862 866 1210
Beijing 0.140 0.284 0.299 0.277 796 1059 1314 2866
Chongqing 0.272 0.408 0.227 0.093 582 820 872 1379
Fujian 0.348 0.453 0.146 0.052 695 942 1103 1855
Gansu 0.216 0.399 0.271 0.114 507 738 869 1135
Guangdong 0.327 0.362 0.231 0.080 748 967 1281 2719
Guizhou 0.292 0.478 0.162 0.069 572 758 925 1189
Hainan 0.328 0.334 0.259 0.080 532 694 894 1527
Hebei 0.230 0.515 0.190 0.066 515 793 832 1233
Heilongjiang 0.217 0.393 0.285 0.104 515 740 797 1096
Henan 0.229 0.428 0.234 0.109 487 675 714 1079
Hubei 0.271 0.384 0.264 0.081 541 757 809 1262
Hunan 0.263 0.444 0.229 0.063 634 828 889 1267
Jiangsu 0.314 0.400 0.210 0.076 758 994 1086 1773
Jiangxi 0.291 0.456 0.196 0.056 525 783 794 1240
Jilin 0.204 0.382 0.307 0.107 522 745 809 1163
Liaoning 0.250 0.410 0.219 0.120 576 822 848 1366
Shaanxi 0.203 0.406 0.277 0.114 497 731 805 1149
Shandong 0.288 0.441 0.203 0.068 602 823 863 1398
Shanghai 0.221 0.321 0.272 0.186 891 1155 1450 3085
Shanxi 0.169 0.520 0.221 0.089 502 872 857 1113
Sichuan 0.277 0.480 0.162 0.081 541 737 829 1477
Tianjin 0.258 0.321 0.285 0.136 995 1019 1074 1617
Yunnan 0.275 0.495 0.160 0.070 504 697 896 1542
Zhejiang 0.357 0.469 0.129 0.045 817 1097 1299 2333
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H.1 Industrial Summary Statistics
Table A.14 presents the distribution of firms by industry and other descriptive statistics.
Table A.14: Manufacturing Survey Descriptive Statistics (2005)
Share of
# of # of Avg # of White State Foreign
Industry firms Regions workers Female Collar Export Equity Equity
Beverage 2,225 155 219.20 .281 .114 .150 .107 .121
Electrical 12,241 166 201.58 .289 .106 .351 .030 .195
Food 3,807 171 193.98 .321 .091 .266 .060 .202
General Machines 15,727 195 152.68 .205 .117 .262 .047 .115
Iron & Steel 4,676 160 227.40 .148 .088 .101 .032 .056
Leather & Fur 4,852 89 320.70 .362 .036 .682 .005 .335
Precision Tools 2,702 68 214.89 .296 .180 .457 .063 .299
Metal Products 10,686 157 146.93 .233 .086 .332 .028 .161
Non-ferrous Metal 3,607 139 157.75 .186 .093 .180 .035 .093
Non-metal Products 15,347 259 195.57 .207 .090 .169 .059 .088
Paper 5,698 159 151.05 .269 .061 .127 .026 .131
Plastic 9,235 159 140.47 .298 .065 .327 .019 .235
PC & AV 6,699 90 402.04 .342 .120 .571 .038 .459
Specific Machines 7,816 167 176.76 .197 .154 .244 .072 .166
Textile 18,292 186 222.43 .390 .044 .406 .018 .168
Wood 3,629 133 137.04 .288 .050 .290 .025 .137
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H.2 Provincial Summary Statistics
Table A.15: Descriptive Statistics by Province (2005)
Manufacturing Population Census
Firm Avg # of # Region- Monthly Avg Yrs
Province Count Workers Regions Industries Wage School
Anhui 2,070 199.3 17 822 832 8.925
Beijing 2,976 137.3 2 128 1665 11.542
Chongqing 967 261.8 3 184 862 9.606
Fujian 6,314 206.5 9 504 945 8.170
Gansu 439 259.3 14 658 805 9.728
Guangdong 19,108 278.1 21 1269 1137 9.607
Guizhou 722 207.0 9 464 805 8.565
Hainan 86 162.6 3 151 830 9.772
Hebei 4,576 229.2 11 623 781 9.527
Heilongjiang 837 258.3 13 622 774 10.197
Henan 5,301 224.4 17 798 720 10.053
Hubei 2,266 236.3 14 742 789 9.731
Hunan 3,200 188.4 14 751 843 9.588
Jiangsu 20,028 168.5 13 756 1013 9.431
Jiangxi 1,363 237.3 11 556 766 9.208
Jilin 677 268.7 9 477 796 10.340
Liaoning 4,570 161.6 14 770 865 10.152
Shaanxi 1,070 318.5 10 548 787 10.068
Shandong 11,374 211.2 17 947 825 9.596
Shanghai 8,521 145.6 2 119 1577 10.569
Shanxi 1,056 375.5 11 619 847 9.895
Sichuan 2,858 234.0 21 887 800 9.149
Tianjin 2,236 186.1 2 128 1119 10.243
Yunnan 659 233.5 16 695 794 8.675
Zhejiang 23,965 143.3 11 629 1098 8.201
H.3 Verisimilitude of Census and Firm Wages
One of the main concerns about combining census data with manufacturing data is the representa-
tiveness of regional labor market conditions in determining actual wages within firms. It turns out
they are remarkably good predictors of a firm’s labor expenses. We construct a predictor of firm
wages based on Census data and test it as follows: First, compute the average wages per prefec-
ture. Second, make an estimate CensusWage by multiplying each firm’s distribution of workers
by the average wages of each type from the population census. Third, regress actual firm wages
on CensusWage. The results are presented in Table A.16 of Appendix H.3. Not only is the R2 of
this predictor very high for each industry, but the coefficient on CensusWage is close to one in all
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cases, showing that one-for-one the census based averages are excellent at explaining the variation
in the wage bill across firms.
Table A.16: Census Wages as a Predictor of Reported Firm Wages
Industry Dependent Variable: ln(Firm Wage)
ln(Census Wage) Std Dev Constant Std Dev Obs R2
Beverage 1.052*** (0.0147) -0.904*** (0.204) 2223 0.85
Electrical 1.018*** (0.0103) -0.370*** (0.138) 12213 0.86
Food 1.032*** (0.0104) -0.602*** (0.144) 3766 0.83
General Machines 1.020*** (0.0063) -0.365*** (0.091) 15711 0.84
Iron & Steel 1.049*** (0.0082) -0.777*** (0.116) 4663 0.87
Leather & Fur 0.982*** (0.0112) 0.116 (0.165) 4851 0.87
Precision Tools 1.018*** (0.0221) -0.332 (0.308) 2689 0.83
Metal Products 1.012*** (0.0094) -0.286** (0.130) 10654 0.83
Non-ferrous Metal 1.054*** (0.0092) -0.833*** (0.127) 3588 0.88
Non-metal Products 0.981*** (0.0085) 0.16 (0.122) 15329 0.80
Paper 1.012*** (0.0086) -0.335*** (0.120) 5695 0.82
Plastic 1.015*** (0.0129) -0.340** (0.170) 9214 0.85
PC & AV 1.021*** (0.0172) -0.354 (0.224) 6685 0.86
Specific Machines 1.036*** (0.0105) -0.580*** (0.139) 7780 0.83
Textile 0.981*** (0.0060) 0.132 (0.084) 18281 0.86
Wood 0.965*** (0.0136) 0.309 (0.197) 3619 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
H.4 Firm Performance Characteristics and Productivity
Table A.17: Explaining Growth with Productivity
Sales Growth Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method -0.0924**
(0.0419)
Productivity under L = 4 Types -0.0648**
(0.0264)
Productivity under L = Wage Bill -0.0641**
(0.0285)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 107,143 107,143 107,143
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
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Table A.18: Explaining Survival with Productivity
Survival Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.0184***
(0.00248)
Productivity under L = 4 Types 0.0109***
(0.00165)
Productivity under L = Wage Bill 0.00968***
(0.00165)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127,082 127,082 127,082
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
H.5 Production Estimates by Method
Table A.19 compares the production coefficients under three measures of labor: unit labor costs,
total wages, and employment of each worker type. In the latter case, the coefficient for type i
workers are labeled α iL.
Table A.19: Second Stage Estimates vs Homogeneous Labor Estimates
Unit Labor Cost Total Wage Bill Employment of Each Type
Industry αL αK αM αL αK αM α1L α2L α3L α4L αK αM
Beverage .18 .13 .62 .23 .06 .71 .07 .01 .07 .06 .07 .75
Electrical .17 .19 .42 .34 .12 .47 .06 .02 .08 .12 .12 .53
Food .15 .11 .65 .16 .06 .73 .07 .03 .09 .08 .12 .52
General Machines .17 .14 .55 .25 .09 .61 .03 .01 .09 .03 .06 .76
Iron & Steel .48 .09 .36 .25 .07 .68 .04 .03 .06 .08 .10 .66
Leather & Fur .07 .18 .53 .27 .09 .55 .01 .07 .11 .05 .06 .71
Precision Tools .17 .18 .44 .44 .08 .38 .02 .13 .07 .05 .09 .57
Metal Products .31 .13 .40 .30 .12 .48 .09 .03 .05 .23 .11 .44
Non-ferrous Metal .17 .10 .58 .17 .10 .65 .03 .04 .06 .02 .06 .71
Non-metal Products .14 .19 .45 .20 .06 .67 .04 .04 .10 .07 .11 .55
Paper .09 .25 .41 .28 .11 .52 .09 .02 .10 .08 .14 .47
Plastic .22 .17 .36 .31 .13 .43 .04 .01 .08 .06 .09 .65
PC & AV .15 .19 .39 .48 .14 .35 .11 .07 .08 .24 .16 .41
Specific Machines .12 .20 .43 .31 .10 .48 .03 .01 .06 .13 .11 .53
Textile .01 .14 .59 .29 .07 .56 .03 .09 .08 .08 .06 .58
Wood .20 .14 .49 .23 .08 .62 .03 .07 .07 .08 .07 .63
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